Document Type : Research

Authors

1 Professor of Philosophy, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran,Iran

2 PhD in Philosophy, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran,

10.30465/crtls.2025.41773.2622
Abstract
This paper presents an analytical and critical review of “Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’ Meditations” by Cecilia Wee (2006), a study devoted to one of the most intricate and overlooked issues in Cartesian philosophy—the notion of material falsity. The book distinguishes between “static” and “dynamic” interpretations of materially false ideas, arguing that Descartes’s understanding of material falsity evolves throughout the Meditations in accordance with his epistemological progress. While Wee’s “dynamic interpretation” is innovative in emphasizing the transformative process of Descartes’s inquiry, it raises significant philosophical challenges. The findings suggest that although Wee’s approach revitalizes the discussion of material falsity and highlights the evolving nature of Descartes’s thought, it remains conceptually ambiguous concerning the representational mechanism of materially false ideas and their relation to truth and epistemic agency.

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  • Receive Date 05 April 2025
  • Revise Date 01 June 2025
  • Accept Date 27 July 2025