Abstract Abstract
This article critically examines Mariana Mazzucato’s seminal work, “The Entrepreneurial State” (2013), assessing the state’s role in promoting innovation and economic development from an analytical perspective. The research substantiates Mazzucato’s strong argument for the active role of the state, emphasizing that targeted industrial policies, rather than market forces alone, are the key factors in fostering transformative innovations. Nevertheless, this theory is subject to significant criticisms. First, the book’s theoretical framework overlooks the constraints of scarce resources and the central role of consumers within a market economy. Second, its predominant focus on the twentieth-century United States experience, devoid of sufficient attention to the contextual and institutional conditions of other nations, diminishes the comprehensiveness of the analysis. Third, Mazzucato’s historical claims regarding the state’s entrepreneurial role in funding research do not necessarily confirm that the state is inherently mission-oriented or entrepreneurial; rather, they may simply be the result of specific historical circumstances. To address these shortcomings, this article suggests that the entrepreneurial state theory necessitates a more precise conceptual definition, the strengthening of transparency and accountability mechanisms, and the prioritization of social justice within policymaking.
 
 
 
 
 
Extended Abstract
 
Abstract
In today’s world, the concept of the innovation ecosystem has become a commonplace term among experts, researchers, and policymakers. It refers to a complex network of diverse actors, including governments, the private sector, universities, and startups that collaborate to foster innovation. However, a fundamental question arises: does government investment in such an ecosystem foster constructive and complementary coexistence with the private sector, or might it instead create contradictions and dysfunction between the two? A key concern is whether government intervention diminishes the private sector’s incentives to invest, prompting it to redirect resources toward short-term profits, or whether, conversely, such investments encourage the private sector to undertake riskier endeavors, such as investing in skilled human capital, research and development, and long-term projects. These debates are deeply rooted in economic theory and reflect the enduring tension between the role of the state and that of the free market.
Introduction
In fact, the notion of an “entrepreneurial state” and targeted industrial policies is far from new. Modern economic history abounds with examples of the state’s central and pioneering role in the emergence of key industries. For instance, the development of the computer industry owed much to massive initial investments by the U.S. government, which laid the groundwork for companies such as Apple and Microsoft. Similarly, the Internet, the backbone of today’s digital economy, originated from government-funded military research projects, notably ARPANET. In the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors, many breakthrough drugs, including vaccines and cancer treatments, stemmed from public investment in basic research. The fields of nanotechnology and green technologies, such as renewable energy, would not have reached their current levels without early and sustained government support. In all these cases, the state has done far more than merely correct market failures; it has dared to envision the seemingly impossible, creating new technological paradigms, making high-risk initial investments, forging decentralized networks of actors to share risk, and ultimately accelerating commercialization to generate dynamic and sustainable growth. This active role challenges the traditional liberal view that casts the state as a passive observer of the market. The present article critically examines Mariana Mazzucato’s influential book The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths (2013). Mazzucato argues that the state is not merely a facilitator of innovation but has often been the boldest and most risk-taking actor in driving transformative technological change. This article evaluates Mazzucato’s arguments analytically and critically, explores the state’s role in promoting innovation and economic development, and offers suggestions for refining her theory.
Materials & Methods
This study is a critical review based on an in-depth analysis of Mazzucato’s “The Entrepreneurial State”. It adopts an analytical-critical approach to assess the state’s role in innovation and economic development. In terms of research classification, the study is fundamental, as it engages deeply with one of the most prominent and influential contemporary economic theories—the “entrepreneurial state.” This theory challenges conventional assumptions about the respective roles of the state and the market and proposes a new paradigm. Methodologically, the research is descriptive-documentary. Primary sources include the text of Mazzucato’s book, the historical evidence it presents, and related literature on industrial policy and the economics of innovation.
Discussion & Result
The findings reveal that Mazzucato presents a compelling case for an active, entrepreneurial role of the state in driving innovation. She emphasizes that many transformative innovations, such as the iPhone’s core technologies (including touch-screen displays and GPS) and the Internet itself, trace their origins to substantial government investment, often resulting from deliberate industrial policies rather than purely market-driven forces. Mazzucato dismantles the widespread myth that the private sector is the primary innovator while the state merely fixes market failures, demonstrating instead that the public sector frequently assumes the greatest initial risks, with private firms entering later to commercialize the results. One of the book’s strongest arguments is that many technological breakthroughs would not have occurred without active industrial policy. In green energy, for example, governments created the foundations for today’s solar and wind markets through early and sustained investment. Nevertheless, the theory invites significant criticisms that cannot be overlooked. First, Mazzucato’s framework largely neglects the constraint of scarce resources: in real economies, public funds are limited, and directing them toward particular projects may crowd out alternative opportunities. It also underemphasizes the vital role of consumers and market signals in guiding innovation. Second, the analysis draws predominantly on the successful twentieth-century experience of the United States, without adequately addressing varying institutional, cultural, and historical contexts in other countries. This limits the theory’s universality, particularly for developing nations or economies with different systems. Third, while Mazzucato’s historical examples illustrate extensive government funding of research, they do not necessarily prove that the state is inherently entrepreneurial; such interventions may reflect unique historical circumstances, such as the Cold War or major economic crises rather than a replicable pattern.
Conclusion
In summary, although the entrepreneurial state theory holds considerable potential to reshape economic policymaking, it requires careful refinement. To mitigate risks such as corruption, inefficiency, or excessive concentration of power, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are essential. This article proposes that the theory could be strengthened by more precisely defining “state entrepreneurship,” enhancing transparency in decision-making, ensuring accountability of public officials, and explicitly incorporating principles of social justice, particularly the equitable distribution of innovation’s benefits. Despite its criticisms, Mariana Mazzucato’s entrepreneurial state theory provides a valuable lens for understanding the state’s role in the modern economy. With the suggested refinements a clearer conceptual framework, greater emphasis on transparency and accountability, and a commitment to social justice and equitable resource distribution, the theory can contribute not only to economic growth and innovation but also to social sustainability, reduced inequality, and enhanced public trust in government institutions. Successful implementation demands precise operational models and ongoing evaluation. Future research should explore the theory’s application across diverse institutional settings, particularly in countries such as Iran, which face unique challenges including economic sanctions and the imperative of technological self-sufficiency. Comparative studies contrasting successful international experiences with the Iranian context could offer practical guidance for policymakers and advance sustainable development.
 
 

Abstract This study undertakes a methodological critique and analytical examination of “Parable and Politics in Early Islamic History: The Rashidun Caliphs” by Tayeb El-Hibri. Its primary aim is to investigate how literary and parabolic concepts are employed in the analysis of historical reports from the formative centuries of Islam, and to diagnose the limitations of the author’s approach in engaging with classical sources. Drawing on hermeneutical and literary analysis, El-Hibri argues that many historical accounts concerning the Rashidun caliphs are not neutral records of events but narrative constructions shaped by the political and religious discourses of the Abbasid caliphate. The findings of the present study indicate that, while El-Hibri offers an innovative and multidimensional reading of the sources, he remains ambiguous in demarcating the boundary between “historical event” and “narrative construction”. Moreover, his strong emphasis on allegedly derivative patterns drawn from Judeo-Christian traditions at times results in a form of historical reductionism. The article ultimately underscores that research on early Islamic history requires a careful balance between literary critique of narratives and the assessment of the historical reliability of sources. Introduction Tayeb El-Hibri, a professor at the University of Massachusetts and a prominent scholar of Islamic historiography, seeks in his works to challenge conventional understandings of Muslim historical sources. The book examined in this article focuses on a period that occupies a distinctive place in Muslim collective memory as an era of perfection followed by decline, marked by conquests and internal conflicts. El-Hibri’s central question concerns the ways in which tales and epic narratives came to articulate political principles and how religious beliefs reshaped the narration of events. He posits the existence of a “narrative body scheme” upon which the history of the early caliphs was constructed, a scheme rooted in the Abbasid caliphate’s need for political legitimation in the third Islamic century. The authors of the present article argue that, despite its analytical appeal, this approach suffers from methodological disarray insofar as it overlooks historical complexity and lacks clear criteria for textual criticism. Materials and Methods  This study employs critical textual analysis and comparative examination of historical reports. Its theoretical framework is grounded in a distinction between “narrative” and “event.” Here, narrative is not understood as a denial of historical reality, but rather as a mode of presenting history that does not necessarily determine the content of the past itself. By categorizing prevailing approaches to the study of Islamic history traditional, isnād-based criticism, interpretive, and revisionist—the authors situate El-Hibri’s methodology within hermeneutical and literary approaches. For a more precise evaluation, the content of the book is divided into two principal categories: “reports presented without critique” and “reports accompanied by critique,” and the author’s criteria in each category are closely examined. Discussion and Findings  Analysis of El-Hibri’s method reveals three major characteristics in his treatment of historical narratives: Retrospective (Backward) Reading of History El-Hibri maintains that early historians wrote history retrospectively, from end to beginning. For example, he interprets reports concerning the sanctification of ʿUthmān during the Prophet’s lifetime as retrospective attempts to justify his later caliphal policies. While such a perspective appears plausible in cases such as political prophecies surrounding ʿUthmān’s assassination, El-Hibri’s analysis of Abū Bakr’s “nine regrets” is marked by haste. In this instance, he attributes the personal reflections of a dying individual to complex narrative structures without sufficient evidence. Derivative Narratives and Judeo-Christian Patterns One of the most contentious aspects of El-Hibri’s method is his claim of borrowing from earlier narrative traditions. He interprets the division of ʿUthmān’s caliphate into six “good” years and six “bad” years as parallel to the story of Joseph and the seven years of abundance followed by famine. The critique advanced here is that similarity does not necessarily entail derivation; many events recur cyclically in history, and El-Hibri does not provide clear methodological criteria to substantiate claims of narrative borrowing. Parabolic and Metaphorical Elements In his analysis of episodes such as the encounter between Hormuzān and ʿUmar or the death of Yazdegerd III, El-Hibri seeks to uncover latent meanings. He interprets Hormuzān’s request for water as a “request for political life,” and the millstone associated with Yazdegerd as a symbol of both subsistence and the decline of power. While these aesthetic interpretations are creative, they blur the boundary between history and storytelling, leaving the reader uncertain about the factual occurrence of the events themselves. The findings indicate that, despite his critique of radical revisionists, El-Hibri at times approaches their positions in practice. His limited engagement with isnād analysis and with the sectarian affiliations of transmitters constitutes another methodological shortcoming, one that risks reducing historical inquiry to literary interpretation.   Conclusion    Although Parable and Politics represents a significant step forward in identifying the “grand narratives” that shaped the minds of Muslim historians, it suffers from a lack of methodological coherence. El-Hibri remains suspended between literary studies, scriptural interpretation, and critical historiography, without establishing consistent criteria for accepting or rejecting historical reports. Nevertheless, his multidimensional perspective and creative efforts to trace the cultural roots of narratives remain valuable for scholars in the field. This study suggests that future research should, while benefiting from literary insights, adopt precise criteria for identifying narrative borrowing and strive to maintain a balance between discourse analysis and historical verification, so as to avoid reducing history to parable alone.  

Abstract This article offers a critical examination of the status of religion and theology within the horizon of postmodernity, with a particular focus on the thought of John D. Caputo. The central question of the study concerns the possibility or impossibility of articulating a “post-metaphysical” theology: a form of theology that, while breaking with the Western metaphysical tradition, is nonetheless capable of preserving its religious meaning and existential function. The point of departure for this inquiry is the historical fact that the modern human and social sciences emerged within the framework of the Enlightenment project and in opposition to traditional theology. This project, with its emphasis on autonomous reason, positivist science, and secularism, either reduced religion to an early stage in the evolution of human consciousness or regarded it as an obstacle to freedom and progress. With the emergence of epistemological, ethical, and existential crises within modernity, and with the advent of the postmodern condition, the possibility of rethinking the relationship between religion, meaning, and human life has once again come to the fore. In this context, postmodern theology, particularly Caputo’s intellectual project, constitutes a significant attempt to restore the credibility of religion within a non-metaphysical horizon. Materials & Methods The methodology employed in this article is analytical, critical, and grounded in a hermeneutical reading of philosophical and theological texts. First, Caputo’s theoretical framework is examined in relation to the critique of metaphysics. Subsequently, the primary sources of his intellectual inspiration, most notably the thought of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida are  analyzed. In this process, conceptual analysis is  used to examine key notions such as “the metaphysics of presence,” “radical hermeneutics,” “religion without religion,” and “theology of the event.” In the final stage, a critical approach is  adopted to assess the internal coherence and theological implications of Caputo’s project. The methodological aim of the article is not merely to describe these positions, but to evaluate their capacity to fulfill the claim of overcoming metaphysics. Discussion & Result The findings of the study indicate that, in the first instance, Caputo, drawing on Heidegger’s critique of the Western metaphysical tradition understands metaphysics as a totalizing and abstract system that, by claiming privileged access to truth, neglects lived reality and the finitude of human existence. This critique is directed in particular at Christian theology influenced by scholastic philosophy, which conceptualized God as the “highest being” or “first cause” and thereby reduced religious faith to the acceptance of theoretical propositions. However, Caputo subsequently regards the Heideggerian critique as insufficient and, by employing Derridean deconstruction, moves toward the formulation of a “radical hermeneutics,” a hermeneutics that emphasizes indeterminacy, historicity, difference, and the impossibility of fixing meaning. Within this framework, Caputo introduces the notion of “religion without religion”: a form of religiosity that relies neither on religious institutions nor on absolute epistemological claims, but rather on faith understood as openness to “the impossible.” By developing a “theology of the event,” Caputo conceives God not as a metaphysical being, but as a name for an event that takes place within history, language, and human experience, and that continually points toward an indeterminate future. The event, in this sense, possesses a “weak force”: a force that does not compel, but nevertheless issues an ethical and existential call, summoning human beings to responsibility before the other. Accordingly, religious faith in Caputo’s thought is less a matter of cognition than an ethical and practical act, realized in love, responsibility, and commitment to the other. Nonetheless, the critical analysis presented in this article demonstrates that Caputo’s project, despite its claim to break with metaphysics, does not fully escape it. Reducing God to a linguistic symbol or an ethical metaphor for the “other” generates serious ambiguity in the relationship between religion and ethics and dissolves the fundamental distinction between the divine and the human. As a result, Caputo’s theology risks devolving into a form of ethical humanism in which religious language is retained while the transcendent and metaphysical dimension of religion is lost. From this perspective, metaphysics in Caputo’s project is not eliminated, but rather displaced from the divine realm to the sphere of human subjectivity and language. Conclusion
In conclusion, the article argues that Caputo’s intellectual project makes a significant contribution to the dynamism of postmodern theology and to the critique of metaphysical and religious forms of violence, while opening a new horizon for understanding faith as an open-ended, non-dogmatic, and ethical experience. Nevertheless, the analyses presented here indicate that the claim of a complete overcoming of metaphysics in Caputo’s thought encounters fundamental difficulties. Although Caputo rightly draws attention to the latent violence of traditional metaphysics and the consequences of authoritarian theology, his substitution of God with the event, language, or the human other entails the risk of reducing religion to ethics. Within such a framework, the distinction between the divine and the human is weakened, and theology remains confined to the horizon of human experience. Consequently, metaphysics is not abolished but rather implicitly and covertly reproduced in the form of anthropocentrism and linguocentrism

Abstract The concept of social class is among the most fundamental yet persistently contested notions in sociology, occupying a central place in theoretical and methodological debates since the emergence of the discipline. Georges Gurvitch, the Russian-born French sociologist, is one of the key thinkers who sought, through a critical and synthetic approach, to move beyond the dominant dichotomies in class theory—most notably the oppositions between economism and culturalism, and between structuralist and action-oriented perspectives. His book Studies on Social Classes (1966), based on lectures delivered at the Sorbonne, represents a systematic attempt to re-examine both Marxist and non-Marxist theories of class and to propose an alternative conceptual framework for understanding class dynamics in industrial societies. Focusing on this work, the present article aims to reconstruct Gurvitch’s theoretical logic and to assess the strengths and limitations of his framework for the analysis of contemporary social classes. The importance of such an inquiry lies in the fact that Gurvitch combines Durkheimian sociology of social totality, the sociology of knowledge, and a strong emphasis on collective consciousness and historical memory to produce a multidimensional conception of class. Despite its theoretical richness, this perspective has received relatively limited independent scrutiny in Iranian sociological literature. The central question guiding the article is therefore how Gurvitch redefines the concept of class, how this redefinition differs from classical theories, and to what extent it can be mobilized for analyzing present-day inequalities and social conflicts. Materials & Methods Methodologically, the study adopts an analytical–critical approach grounded in systematic textual analysis. Its primary source is Gurvitch’s Studies on Social Classes, in which Marxist perspectives (Marx, Engels, Kautsky, Lenin, and Lukács) and non-Marxist approaches (Schmoller, Pareto, Weber, Schumpeter, Halbwachs, and Sorokin) are examined comparatively. In addition to close reading of Gurvitch’s arguments, the article draws on secondary theoretical literature to evaluate the conceptual coherence and methodological implications of his framework. The methodological orientation of the article is itself inspired by Gurvitch’s own logic, particularly his use of the typological method and his insistence on distinguishing different levels of depth within social reality. Accordingly, theories are analyzed not merely in terms of their propositional content, but with reference to the level of social reality on which they primarily focus—economic, legal, cultural, symbolic, or cognitive. This strategy allows for a comparative assessment of each approach in terms of explanatory power, conceptual consistency, and its capacity to be connected with empirical research. On this basis, the article proceeds to a critical evaluation of Gurvitch’s synthetic theory of class and the degree to which its core concepts are operationalizable. Discussion & Result The findings indicate that, in his critique of Marxist theories, Gurvitch fully acknowledges Marx’s foundational role in linking social classes to relations of production, while simultaneously emphasizing the conceptual ambiguities and analytical fluctuations within the Marxist tradition. From Gurvitch’s perspective, Marxist definitions of class are often either negative (defined by opposition) or overly dependent on the factor of production, thereby marginalizing the cultural, legal, and cognitive dimensions of class experience. Through a historical reading of Marx’s works—from the early philosophical writings to the historical texts and Capital—Gurvitch demonstrates that the concept of class is not fixed but undergoes significant transformations. This variability is, in his view, both a strength, reflecting historical sensitivity, and a source of theoretical indeterminacy. In engaging with non-Marxist theories, Gurvitch shows that their emphasis on factors such as occupation, status, collective psychology, or life chances contributes to the analytical enrichment of the concept of class. Nevertheless, these approaches frequently suffer from a lack of totality and an inability to account for structural conflicts. In theories such as those of Weber or Pareto, class is reduced to a set of individual positions or elite configurations and thus fails to appear as a social totality capable of resisting the global (or total) society. Gurvitch’s principal contribution lies in his formulation of a synthetic definition of social classes. He conceives classes as phenomenal and diffuse groupings characterized by overfunctional (transfunctional) character, fundamental non-convergence, resistance to the total society, and a strong tendency toward intensive structuration. Within this framework, class is not merely an economic location but a multilayered phenomenon constituted simultaneously at material and cognitive levels. However, the analysis also shows that this very holism and multiplicity of criteria lead to diminished conceptual clarity and considerable difficulties in operationalizing Gurvitch’s key notions. The article further highlights shortcomings in Gurvitch’s theory, including limited attention to gender relations, intermediate groups, the state, social movements, and processes of globalization. Conclusion Overall, the study concludes that Gurvitch’s theory of social classes, despite its limitations, offers a rich and innovative framework for overcoming reductionist tendencies in class analysis. His emphasis on the dialectical linkage between objective structures, collective consciousness, and cultural productions enables a more complex understanding of social inequalities and conflicts. At the same time, the absence of a clear operational definition, the difficulty of empirical testing, and insufficient engagement with certain contemporary transformations underscore the need for critical revision and extension. The article ultimately argues that effective use of Gurvitch’s framework requires translating his key concepts into measurable indicators, paying closer attention to gendered and transnational dimensions of class, and employing mixed methodological strategies in empirical research. Under these conditions, a Gurvitchian perspective can possess not only historical significance but also substantial analytical relevance for the study of social classes in contemporary societies, including the Iranian context.

Abstract This article focuses on the concept of “foreign policy costs” of great powers based on Paul Kennedy’s theory on “the rise and fall of great powers” and examines their impact on the evolution of power in international relations. The foreign policy of great powers is costly, depending on the claims and commitments they have made. They expect benefits in return for their foreign policy costs. The main question of the present article is what effect does increasing foreign policy spending have on the survival of the great power position? The initial answer is that although the increasing trend of foreign policy costs relative to foreign policy benefits facilitates the decline of the great power position and the great powers' shift, the mechanism of the impact of spending on power is much more complex than that proposed in Kennedy’s theory. This article seeks to provide a relatively comprehensive analysis of the theory's strengths and weaknesses.   Materials and Methods Some of international relations theorists, focusing on the material dimensions of national power in international politics, have spoken of the cyclical shift of great powers. One of the famous researchers in this field is Paul Kennedy. This article considers the important criticisms of Kennedy's theory and then attempts to present, through a qualitative method, a more comprehensive analytical framework regarding the rise and fall of state power in the present era.     Discussion and Results In a great study, conducted on the interaction of economic capabilities and military strategy of great powers from the sixteenth to the late twentieth century, Kennedy emphasizes the concept of "imperial overstretch" as the driver of the power cycle. In the process of the rise, growth, and decline of great powers, there is a clear connection between "economic rise and fall" and "military rise and fall." Although economic and technological power alone have not determined the course of changes, their role in the rise and fall of countries has been critical. While introducing the United States as a superpower doomed to decline, Kennedy advises its officials to accept current realities and avoid futile conflicts, and to manage affairs in such a way that the relative erosion of the country's position occurs smoothly and slowly. He adds that one of the current global trends is the development of the Pacific region, which is likely to persist in the future and seems to shift the center of gravity of the world economy towards Asia and the Pacific. Kennedy writes about China that if the current process of China's development continues, its position will change within a few decades. Although the country faces weaknesses such as low technology, there are interesting signs about China's reform and self-improvement. Kennedy's theory has faced various critical reactions. The first point is that the idea of ​​a destiny of decline is along with a kind of determinism in social changes. When decision-makers realize that their decisions will lead to mainly negative and destructive results, they can correct them. Second, Kennedy's view of the process of world economic changes is not comprehensive. Kennedy does not attempt to analyze the driving forces of economic growth and development during the last 500 years of history, and this could seriously damage his main thesis. The third is the lack of attention to the non-economic dimensions of military capability. For example, coalition-building diplomacy has a great impact on military and geopolitical capability. The fourth criticism is the reduction of power to hard economic and military elements. Other factors, including the capability of the political system, the genius of decision-makers, social values, and identity potential, are underestimated. The fifth criticism is the incomplete narrative of historical developments. Kennedy, for example, does not explain why Habsburg Spain lost its powerful position in Europe and the world and withdrew from the scene of great power competition, but France and Britain still remaining as great powers of the world. The final point is that the costs of foreign policy are manageable. It is possible to reduce the costs of foreign policy while strengthening soft power.   Conclusion The essence of all criticisms is that Kennedy's theory of the power cycle has not seen some important and influential variables influencing power shifts, including soft power components.  Despite these points, Kennedy's theory still has a wide influence in academic circles, and its alarming effect on the foreign policy decision-makers seems undeniable. Decision-makers in great powers have more or less come to the realization that, although military and economic strength facilitates the pursuit of national goals and interests in the world, it may not be sufficient to compensate for major costly foreign policy mistakes. Power may even have a misleading effect, inciting states to make decisions whose destructive consequences for national interests far outweigh the expected benefits. The exorbitant and increasing costs of foreign policy projects can push a great power toward decline and submission to the emergence of an alternative great power. States sometimes realize the costs of their decisions when there is no way back.  

Abstract In his treatise “Moral Sentiments”, Adam Smith, by examining various situations of action, has presented a mechanistic plan of action. This plan is the basis of the relationship in the human world and exchange as a relationship in the market. Through this, Smith has been able to talk about the market mechanism and show how the scene of human action is self-founded and does not need forces or rules outside of itself. This conclusion has led him to write a chapter on the state in the book "Moral Sentiments" and to empty it of politics (as an idea outside the human scene). For Smith, the state is merely an administrative mechanism. In this case, rationality in administration and the market cannot have a human meaning. Rather, it is like a force imposed by the scene on humans. This has become the basis of many policy-making decisions in economics and statecraft. It seems that there is a conflict between the meaning, value, and political decisions of a nation and its economic interests, and humans are always condemned to wash their hands of will, awareness, and freedom. But is this situation bearable and feasible for humans? The present study, by examining the social history of markets, sought to find the answer to the question: Is the market a completely calculative matter, and is human reason opposed to his will and creativity? Has the market really been built in history by calculation, or can the role of non-calculation (politics and ideas) in the formation of the rational and modern market (Market) be found? Materials & Methods:  The present research has used historical-comparative sociology to study the history of the market. This method, which was invented by Max Weber and has evolved over time, is different from historical-comparative studies by the currents of German historicism, the world school, Marxism, and conventional economic history, which deal with the calendar-like expression of events or examine a period of history to find the cause of its occurrence and then compare it with another similar event (such as the development of industry or the occurrence of riots) to obtain their differences and similarities. In the comparative historical sociology of economics, the researcher first finds a history as the origin and emergence of that matter (for example, the rational and self-based market) through extensive studies. Then, he continues the study by studying its constituent components and the combination of those components. In this path, he must find other historical periods before and after that date to rule out the role of other factors except the main factor (which in this research is the role of politics and will) and study them to show what consequences and role the presence and absence of the factor under study had in that period and how it was that the main subject and object (the self-based market and economic rationality in this research) only emerged in a specific period with a specific combination of the desired factors. Therefore, the main period studied in this research is the period of mercantilism, in which the market and unified and rational economic calculations and measures, such as the trade balance, the country's public treasury, imports and exports, consumption, tariffs, etc., were created. Then, by measuring the effect of politics and political speech of rulers in other periods such as the history of the Silk Roads, Ancient Greece, Rome in the late Middle Ages, and the Hanseatic League (the first economic-political alliance) in the late Middle Ages, it explains the effect of the political factor in the formation of the market, the organization of market organizations and market society, and the development and invention of economic-rational calculations. Discussion & Result  According to the study conducted, it was determined that during the long periods of global free trade along the Silk Road or the center of global free trade, namely Rome, despite the great prosperity of trade and the absence of political interventions, economic calculations, market mechanisms, social organization for production and trade, the invention of single measures and calculation scales, the invention of methods based on productivity and calculations of time and profit in organizing production and trade never took root and developed. But in times when the state - cities or national states were in tension with other geographies and the issue of the city's power was tied to its wealth (trade and production) - such as in ancient Greece and the era of mercantilism, and to some extent in the trade union of the Han, we witness the growth and flourishing of creativity, social organization based on the economy, coordination of individual interests in line with collective interests, the invention of technologies and tools, the invention of measures and scales, the invention of commercial calculations, the invention of money as a tool for the rational organization of society, bureaucracy as the rationality of administration, and the like. In fact, historical findings have shown that wherever human ideas and designs (meanings) have laid a plan for the city and the country, although problems have arisen - such as the tensions of the Greek city-states or the era of mercantilism - but the pursuit of solving those problems in proximity to the political discourse of the city has also opened up powerful horizons of benefit in trade, which has ultimately led to an increase in political power. Conclusion:   What Smith draws as the mechanism of relationship and the mechanism of the market, although it is an attempt to maintain the continuity of life and save it from chaos and disorder, history has evidence that shows that continuity and discontinuity, calculation and non-calculation, are related to each other. Until there is an idea, a question, and a plan to limit the world, there will be no question (unknown), and until there is no unknown, no calculation will be made. The economy and the market, as a scene of trade and the rational pursuit of profit, transcend the calculations of livelihood and day-to-day life and emerge as an order and arrangement when, like a clock, its individual and separate parts can work in unison. The mechanism is the design of order, and order is the direction that the whole takes. The self-organizing order of the market, which coordinates its parts, is the product of a design for the order and direction of the parts. When such a plan of the relationship between politics and economics is in place, the ideal is put to the real test of life, and only that national idea that can propose a way of living and living, a way of calculating things, can also build an economy and a market. And on the other hand, that trade can appear as an economic power for a country and pursue its economic order that can strengthen the national discourse and the meaning that has held a nation together.

Abstract Introduction The book “Philosophy of the Science of Jurisprudence”, written by Hujjat al-Islam, Dr. Saeed Ziyaifar, is one of the first works on the philosophy of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in Iran and remains one of the few available resources on this subject. The book is notable for its well-organized structure, precise categorization of topics, and exploration of various possibilities related to them, alongside extensive research and accurate references to primary sources. Despite these positive attributes, there are some shortcomings in the book that, if addressed in future editions, could enhance its value. One of the most challenging sections is Chapter Four, titled "The Goals of the Science of Jurisprudence". This article provides structural and content-related critiques of this chapter. Methodology The data for this study were gathered through library research, utilizing both printed and electronic sources. The analysis was carried out using a descriptive-analytical approach. Initially, some of the topics discussed in Philosophy of the Science of Jurisprudence are summarized, followed by a critical analysis of these issues, primarily from the perspective of the science of Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence). Discussion and Conclusion Chapter Four of Philosophy of the Science of Jurisprudence consists of introductory discussions, four sub-sections, and two concluding discussions. In the first sub-section, the author delves into the important issue of "Methods for Discovering the Goals of Shari'a," outlining three main, non-integrative methods for discovering the goals of Shari'a: the textual method, the rational method, and the empirical method. The author then mentions the possibility of combining these methods, and in the "Gathering of Evidence" approach, a combination of the aforementioned methods can be utilized. After explaining these methods, the author proceeds with a detailed discussion on the ways in which the goals of the Shari'a can influence Ijtihᾱd (juridical reasoning) and Tafaqquh (religious knowledge). The chapter concludes with a brief reference to "Examples of the Goals of the Shari'a". Several structural criticisms can be made regarding this chapter, including the unsatisfactory placement and order of some key discussions, such as "Methods for Proving the Dimensions of Fiqh Rulings," "Methods for Discovering the Goals of Shari'a," and "Methods for Influencing Ijtihᾱd and Tafaqquh." Another category of critiques pertains to the content of the chapter. The main content-related criticisms addressed in this article include: 1.          A blending of "Shari'a and Juridical Rulings" with "The Science of Deductive Jurisprudence" on the one hand, and a mixing of "The Goals and Objectives of the Shari'a" with "The Cause and Grounds of Rulings" on the other. This results in some back-and-forth between these concepts. 2.          The author applies the views of the 'Usulī (rationalist) and Akhbᾱrī (traditionalist) scholars on "Ruling and its Cause" to the discussion of "The Goals of the Science of Fiqh," which does not seem to be a solid comparison. 3.          In this chapter, the concept of Qīyᾱs Mansūs al-‘Illah (analogy based on a stated cause) is listed as a way of discovering the rational cause of rulings. However, this analogy is, firstly, dependent on recognizing the cause (not its method), and secondly, the method of discovering the cause in this type of analogy is based on textual sources, not rational reasoning. 4.          The book's discussion on the scope of the applicability of incomplete induction (istiqrᾱ’ nᾱqis) in discovering the goals of Shari'a is ambiguous, and the foundational argument for it is not established. Similar ambiguities are found in other key sections of the chapter, such as the empirical method and the methods for proving the dimensions of juridical rulings. 5.          The definition of analogy (qīyᾱs) and its function, as presented by the respected author, requires serious reconsideration in light of the common terminology used in Fiqh and 'Usūl, and the views of Islamic scholars. In Chapter Four, the unknown object to which analogy is applied to gain knowledge is described as the goal or cause of a ruling. However, according to the traditional definition of analogy, the unknown in an analogy is the ruling of the second subject, not its cause. Proponents of analogy argue that they have identified the cause of the ruling in two subjects—albeit tentatively—and thus derive the ruling of the second subject. Conclusion
While The Philosophy of the Science of Jurisprudence presents numerous strengths, it also contains points that are open to critique, and it is recommended that these issues be addressed in future revisions. Chapter Four of the book, in particular, is worthy of further consideration and critique in at least two respects: first, the "order of presentation," "selection of main and subsidiary titles," and "the relationship between some of the topics" could be restructured to provide a more logical flow, making the text easier to follow for the reader and improving the proportionality of the various discussions. This would also ensure that significant topics are more effectively represented in the table of contents; second, some content in Chapter Four, both in terms of its internal coherence with other sections of the book and from the perspective of 'Usūl al-Fiqh, requires revision to ensure clarity and consistency