Monetary Independence under the Global Financial Cycle: Institutional Congruence and a Balance-Sheet Critique of the London Consensus

Document Type : Research

Author

Shahid Beheshti University

10.30465/crtls.2026.54376.3011
Abstract
This article reconsiders the monetary-financial dimension of The London Consensus in light of institutional congruence and balance-sheet fragility. While accepting Hélène Rey’s account of the global financial cycle, it asks whether the enlargement of the macroprudential toolkit, in the absence of explicit provisions for implementation, supervision, and accountability, adequately addresses the mechanisms by which global shocks are transmitted. Institutional congruence is understood as consistency among the definition of the problem, its causal explanation, the instruments prescribed, and the institutions charged with their implementation. An exploratory panel analysis brings together U.S. monetary-policy surprises, bank-credit data, prudential-policy changes, and Worldwide Governance Indicators for 42 economies. Estimates for quarterly prudential-policy changes yield statistically significant interactions with monetary surprises and institutional balance at one- and four-quarter horizons, revealing differences in credit sensitivity across institutional and regulatory conditions. The findings inform a four-level policy framework linking balance-sheet vulnerabilities to supervisory mandates, crisis-management capacities, and accountability. The article argues that effective monetary independence depends not merely on available policy instruments, but on the coherence and adaptability of the monetary-financial institutions through which those instruments operate.

Keywords

Subjects


Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 15 November 2026

  • Receive Date 25 February 2026
  • Revise Date 30 October 2026
  • Accept Date 15 November 2026