Pizhuhish nāmah-i intiqādī-i mutūn va barnāmah hā-yi ̒ulūm-i insāni (Critical Studies in Texts & Programs of Human Sciences)

Abstract The purpose of this article is to critically review and evaluate the book "Theological Roots of Modernity" written by Alan Gillespie. The work is one of the successful socio-theological texts. The author develops his idea in the book with an optimistic stance towards modernity. His main concern is to prove the role of theology in the formation of modernity. A claim that has no place in the narrative of the Age of Enlightenment. Gillespie believes that not only is the antithesis to religion not the basis of modernity, but modernity has a religious origin and emerged in a theological dialogue; it is not a new issue. The conflict over the issue of the will of God and man, and the combination of the duality of determinism and free will, shape subsequent philosophical conflicts in every era. From the nominalist revolution to Petrarch's invention of individuality, the subsequent insoluble contradictions between Erasmus and Luther over the consequential problem of the contradiction between the will of God and the will of man provided the ground for Descartes to establish the semantics of subjectivity that has formed the basis of modernity and the present West. Gillespie analyzes modern evil as the transfer of divine attributes to man or the secularization of these attributes. Thus, he speaks of the disappearance of secularization and attributes the responsibility for the disasters of world wars and other modern evils to the secularization of divine attributes and their transfer to man and social forces. The purpose of this article is to critically review and evaluate the book “Theological Roots of Modernity” by Alan Gillespie. This book is one of the successful socio-theological texts. The author develops his idea in the book with an optimistic stance towards modernity. His main concern is to prove the role of theology in the formation of modernity. This idea has no place in the narrative of the Enlightenment. Gillespie believes that not only is the antithesis to religion not the basis of modernity, but modernity has a religious origin and emerged in a theological dialogue, and is not a new issue. Michael Alan Gillespie bases his opposition to modernity on his opposition to the thesis of secularization; he sees all of modern science as based on the subject of autonomy and self-understanding to the extent that it has transferred the attributes of the infinite God to finite man and has made the divine attributes secular in a hidden way. He calls the concealment of secularization the beginning of all the contradictions and evils that can be revealed by tracing the theological roots of modernity. Gillespie believes that humanists did not deny God; they sought to elevate man from a helpless and forced nominalist being to a creative being, which was itself dependent on the existence of God, in the sense that the path to knowing God passes through man. The conflict over the question of the will of God and man, and the combination of the duality of determinism and free will, shape the fundamental philosophical conflicts in every era. From the nominalist revolution to Petrarch’s invention of individuality, the subsequent insoluble contradictions between Erasmus and Luther over the consequential problem of the contradiction between the will of God and the will of man provided the ground for Descartes to establish the semantics of subjectivity that has formed the basis of modernity and the current West. In Gillespie's accounts, the debate between Descartes and Hobbes in the Objections and Replies to the Meditations is reminiscent of the debate between Erasmus and Luther, which was a dispute over free will and divine omnipotence; but between Descartes and Hobbes, the debate is over nature and man, with nature taking the place of God. Descartes considers man a natural divine being, and Hobbes considers man a completely natural being. Descartes makes room for human will, and Hobbes rejects human will. Gillespie considers these contradictions to be equally insoluble. He considers the basis of the contradiction between Descartes and Hobbes to be a contradiction in Kant's third dialectical proposition. Kant believes in dialectical arguments in issues such as will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God, in the sense that these propositions can neither be rationally proven nor simply rejected. Gillespie does not distinguish between these controversies and contradictions and reduces them to their theological roots. He attempts to analyze modern evil in terms of the transfer of divine attributes to man or the secularization of these attributes, and he attributes the responsibility for the disasters of world wars and other modern evils to the secularization of divine attributes and their transfer to man by social and historical forces. For Descartes and Erasmus, man has free will, and for Hobbes and Luther, the only thing behind the movement of matter is the absolute power of God as the final cause. This is the same issue of the relationship between human will and divine absolute will that was problematic in the very beginning of Christianity and is now resurfacing at the center of modernity. The modern ontological turn from man and God to nature confronts man with the same issue that Hobbes and Descartes’ successors in the modern tradition were struggling with. Kant's polemical propositions clearly show this issue. There is a clear distinction between Karl Lewit's and Gillespie's perspectives on modernity. This is because Gillespie's idea is opposed to the anti-Enlightenment thought that criticizes modernity with a negative and pessimistic approach. Gillespie considers modernity, which stems from humanism, to have theological roots and analyzes the historical course of modernity in the context of contradictions and challenges of the debate about human will and agency. He is opposed to the thought that traces the roots of humanism and modernity to ancient Greek culture and pre-Christian works. Alan Gillespie has many aspects in common with Karl Lewit's thought. However, Gillespie never seeks to illegitimate or misrepresent modernity and has an optimistic perspective on modernity due to its theological origins. But Levitt criticizes modern thought with a pessimistic view, since it is secularized in theological concepts, lacking any kind of independent knowledge. The neglect of ancient Greek and pre-Christian ideas in finding the roots of the epistemological nature of modernity is evident in Gillespie's thought. On the other hand, the progressive and advancing understanding of history, with the occurrence of the human tragedies of the twentieth century, has revealed more than ever the evil of reason itself, the foundation of modernity. The existence of such tragedies brings to mind a contradiction with the idea of the theological roots of modernity and the transfer of the attributes of a benevolent God to man, which remains unanswered in Gillespie's thought. On the other hand, the reduction of modernity to its theological roots plunges modernity into serious difficulties and closes the way to the inclusive world of modern reason. If we consider Judeo-Christian theology as the necessary antecedent to the emergence of modernity, we diminish modernity and confine it to an inherently Western time, and modernity is stripped of its universality. In this case, modernity will be local, not universal, and we must inevitably submit to a refusal to repeat the experience of modernity in contexts and times that lack this theological background.

Abstract The present article offers a critical review of Wasserstrom's book "Religion After Religion", examining its main themes, methodological approaches, and scholarly impacts. The primary objective of this article was to assess how Wasserstrom portrays the contributions of Scholem, Eliade, and Corbin to modern religious thought, particularly their shared focus on mysticism, symbolism, and the phenomenological study of religion. Utilizing text-based content analysis of the book, this research examined Wasserstrom's use of the concept "Religion After Religion" and his critical engagement with the scholars' ideological commitments and methodological choices. The findings highlighted significant strengths, such as Wasserstrom's comprehensive historical context and interdisciplinary approach, but also raised notable criticisms. These include ambiguity in defining "Religion After Religion," which blurs the boundaries between personal spirituality, academic inquiry, and ideological commitments, raising questions about the concept's coherence as an analytical category. Additionally, the overemphasis on mysticism often overshadows critical historical analysis, particularly in Scholem's works, and an insufficient critique of the ethical dimensions of the scholars' political ideologies limits the depth of Wasserstrom's analysis. This review emphasizes the need for a more balanced and precise engagement with the complex interplay between mysticism, history, and politics in modern religious studies. This article presents a comprehensive critical examination of Steven M. Wasserstrom's seminal work "Religion After Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Corbin at Eranos" (1999), analyzing its methodological approaches, scholarly contributions, and theoretical limitations within the broader context of modern religious studies. The research employs a text-based content analysis methodology to evaluate Wasserstrom's portrayal of three pivotal figures who fundamentally transformed twentieth-century approaches to religious scholarship through their convergence at the Eranos conferences in Ascona, Switzerland. The central thesis examines how Wasserstrom conceptualizes "Religion After Religion" as a framework for understanding the intellectual trajectory of Gershom Scholem (1897-1982), the pioneering scholar of Jewish mysticism and Kabbalah; Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), the Romanian phenomenologist and historian of religions; and Henry Corbin (1903-1978), the French philosopher and Iranologist specializing in Islamic esotericism. These scholars shared a fundamental commitment to phenomenological approaches that prioritized mystical experience, symbolic interpretation, and the transcendent dimensions of religious phenomena over purely historical-critical or sociological methodologies. Wasserstrom's analysis demonstrates how the Eranos conferences, established in 1933 by Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn under Carl Jung's influence, created an unprecedented intellectual milieu that facilitated interdisciplinary dialogue between scholars, mystics, psychologists, and philosophers. This unique environment deliberately blurred traditional academic boundaries, encouraging participants to engage with subjects that integrated systematic scholarship with spiritual inquiry. The conferences became instrumental in fostering what Wasserstrom terms "dialectical imagination" – a dynamic mode of thinking that enabled these scholars to navigate between contradictory ideas and synthesize diverse perspectives into coherent understandings of religious phenomena. The study reveals several significant strengths in Wasserstrom's approach, particularly his comprehensive historical contextualization and interdisciplinary methodology. His analysis effectively illuminates how phenomenological approaches enabled deeper engagement with the experiential and symbolic dimensions of religious traditions, moving beyond reductionist explanations that limited religious phenomena to social, psychological, or historical factors. Wasserstrom successfully demonstrates how each scholar's work reflected a shared focus on mysticism, symbolism, and the phenomenological study of religion, while simultaneously maintaining their distinctive methodological signatures. However, the analysis identifies substantial methodological and conceptual limitations that constrain the depth and precision of Wasserstrom's critical engagement. The most significant weakness lies in the ambiguous definition of "Religion After Religion", which blurs boundaries between personal spirituality, academic inquiry, and ideological commitments. This conceptual imprecision raises fundamental questions about the coherence of this framework as an analytical category and its utility for understanding the complex relationship between mystical engagement and scholarly objectivity. The research highlights four primary areas of critical concern. First, the phenomenological emphasis, while providing insights into mystical dimensions, often overshadows critical historical analysis, particularly evident in Wasserstrom's treatment of Scholem's rigorously historical approach to Jewish mysticism. This methodological imbalance risks misrepresenting the sophisticated integration of mystical interpretation with empirical historical research that characterized Scholem's scholarly methodology. Second, the analysis demonstrates insufficient engagement with the ethical implications of the scholars' political and ideological commitments, particularly Eliade's associations with Romanian nationalism and the Iron Guard, and Corbin's romanticization of Iranian spirituality, which often overlook complex socio-political realities. Third, the study reveals methodological inadequacies in Wasserstrom's treatment of phenomenological limitations. The phenomenological suspension of judgment, while facilitating deeper engagement with subjective religious experience, can lead to overly idealistic interpretations of religious symbols and practices, treating them as timeless truths rather than constructs shaped by specific historical and cultural contexts. This methodological concern is particularly relevant given critiques by scholars such as Jonathan Z. Smith, who argue that phenomenological approaches can obscure the material conditions and power structures that shape religious phenomena. Fourth, the analysis exposes the problematic conflation of mystical engagement with academic objectivity inherent in the concept of "Religion After Religion". This conflation raises fundamental questions about the boundaries between personal spiritual exploration and scholarly inquiry, particularly regarding how ideological commitments influence interpretive choices and theoretical frameworks. The research findings emphasize the need for more balanced and precise engagement with the complex interplay between mysticism, history, and politics in modern religious studies. While acknowledging the innovative contributions of phenomenological approaches to understanding religious experience, the analysis argues for methodological frameworks that maintain critical distance from the subjects of study while remaining sensitive to their experiential dimensions. The study concludes that although Wasserstrom's work provides valuable insights into the intellectual development of three influential scholars, its limitations necessitate more rigorous critical engagement with the methodological and ethical dimensions of their scholarship. Future research should address the identified gaps by developing analytical frameworks that can accommodate both the phenomenological insights and the critical-historical rigor necessary for a comprehensive understanding of religious phenomena. This critical evaluation contributes to ongoing scholarly debates about the appropriate methodological approaches for religious studies, particularly regarding the tension between empathetic understanding and critical analysis. The research demonstrates the importance of maintaining analytical precision when examining the intersection of personal spirituality, academic scholarship, and ideological commitment, while recognizing the continuing influence of these scholars on contemporary religious thought and the necessity of engaging critically with their intellectual legacy.

Abstract In the modern era, after the weakening of theoretical rationality, religious experience became the center of attention of many philosophers of religion. Among the topics that these philosophers showed great interest in is the nature of religious experience and its validity. For example, Schleiermacher and Otto considered religious experience to be a feeling associated with consciousness, and Alston and Swinburne tried to validate it by expressing its similarity with sensory experience. The book "Elements of the Philosophy of Religion: Religious Experience", after a brief overview of some views on the nature of religious experience and explaining the perceptual approach to prove the validity of religious experiences and the challenges facing them, is based on the fact that such discussions about religious experience are based on a knowledge-centered approach in the philosophy of religion; An approach that, by creating limitations in the definition of religious experience and its exclusivity in certain experiences, only seeks to discover the correspondence of these experiences with reality. But the author considers it necessary to complement this knowledge-centered approach with an understanding- centered approach. The understanding-centered approach considers the development of religious man's understanding to be much more important than the discovery of correspondence with reality, and it is based on the philosophy of religion that it is necessary to be oriented towards the development of the subject and the expansion of his understanding. The discussion of the nature of religious faith and its relationship with components such as belief, practice, emotion, and experience are among the most central topics in the philosophy of religion. The primary question is: What roles do knowledge, belief, practice, and experience play in the realization of faith? In response, two major perspectives have emerged: 1. The Experiential-Emotional View: This approach places faith primarily within the realm of feeling and immediate experience. 2. The Propositional Rationalist View: This view emphasizes true beliefs corresponding to reality as the core of faith. Both perspectives place knowledge at the center of their analysis. This book, while reviewing these viewpoints, seeks to strengthen an understanding-centered approach in the philosophy of religion. In this approach, the focus shifts from merely verifying the correspondence of beliefs or experiences with reality (knowledge-centeredness) to the process of forming understanding within the knowing subject. Dr. Amber Griffioen’s book is significant precisely because it presents and develops this transition from knowledge-centeredness to understanding-centeredness. The author argues that modern philosophy of religion’s focus on examining the nature of religious experience and proving its objectivity to justify beliefs is a limited perspective. From Griffioen’s viewpoint, what is fundamentally important is the role of religious experiences—alongside beliefs, concepts, practices, moral dispositions, rituals, imaginations, and even illusions—in the process of forming a deeper understanding of religion. Consequently, the task of philosophy of religion is not merely to analyze how true beliefs or objective experiences are attained, but to explain how the knowing subject is influenced by a complex set of factors (sights, sounds, mental images, rational arguments, mystical experiences, spiritual practices, and the ethical, social, historical, and political dimensions of religion) to achieve a richer and transformative understanding. This approach positions the philosophy of religion at the intersection of epistemology, anthropology, and hermeneutics, while also significantly expanding the scope of valid religious experiences. Griffioen examines religious experience and the evolution of approaches to it across five chapters: 1. History of Religious Experience: Identifies Schleiermacher, Rudolf Otto, and William James as key influencers. These thinkers aimed to counter extreme rationalism. 2. Perennialism vs. Constructivism: Analyzes the debate between proponents of "Perennial Philosophy" (represented by Otto, Eliade, Stace, Yandell, Forman—who posit a common, universal core in religious/mystical experiences) and "Constructivists" (who argue experiences are shaped by prior concepts and cultural-linguistic contexts). Reports mediating approaches like John Hick’s "Critical Realism". 3. Validity of Religious Experiences: Examines two main strategies for defending the objectivity and epistemic validity of religious experiences: William Alston: By analogizing the "doxastic practice" of religious experience to sense perception, using the "Partners in Guilt" strategy. Richard Swinburne: By relying on the "Principle of Credulity" and the "Principle of Testimony". 4. Challenges to Alston and Swinburne's Approaches: Enumerates key challenges against the analogy between religious experience and sense perception: the inapprehensibility of God vs. the apprehensibility of sensory objects; the untestability of religious experiences vs. the testability of sensory experiences; the existence of naturalistic (bio-psychological) explanations for religious experiences; and the diversity and conflict among reported religious experiences. 5. Expanding the Scope of Religious Experience and Understanding-Centeredness: The book's pivotal chapter. Griffioen argues that the importance of religious experiences lies not in their objective representation of reality, but in expanding the individual's understanding of religious truth. Therefore, the scope of religious experience must be expanded to include: Imaginative and non-reality-revealing experiences, Experiences arising from ritual practices (active experiences), Sensory and bodily experiences, Non-theistic or non-monotheistic religious experiences, Experiences with negative valence (e.g., fear of the sacred), Group and social experience. The benefits of this expansion include: amplifying minority voices, achieving a more global approach to meaning-making, bridging communication gaps, better understanding others' reasons, and reforming epistemic arrogance. Two major critiques of the book can be raised: 1. Ambiguity in Defining Religious Experience and its Relation to Mystical Experience: The book fails to provide a clear definition of "religious experience" or address its distinction from (or identity with) "mystical experience." This ambiguity is problematic throughout the book, especially in discussions on perennialism, constructivism, and the approaches of Alston and Swinburne. Different definitions of mystical experience and their varying implications necessitate a clearer subject definition. 2. Critiquing the Foundations of Understanding-Centeredness from an Islamic Perspective: Based on Islamic principles such as the gradational nature of religion, the comprehensive reality of the human being, and the nature of faith, understanding plays two essential roles in religious faith: as the necessary cognitive element for faith, and as a factor

Abstract Rovzat ol-Muridin is a mystical prose work written in Arabic by Abu Ja'far ibn Yazdaniyar Hamadani (380-472). Today, there are manuscripts of this work in the world, and Suri and Pourjavadi have corrected and published this work for the first time. The book Rovzat ol-Muridin is a concise and comprehensive work that has 44 chapters and is written in simple and fluent language. The main question is what the place of Rovzat ol-Muridin in mystical sources is, and what the value and importance of this source is. This work is similar to other mystical works of that period and explains mystical principles in a simple way. Dividing topics into types can be considered one of its expressive techniques. The editors have presented the book in three parts: introduction, text, and notes, along with an index. They had eleven copies in their hands in correcting the text, seven of which were used. There are some questions and even doubts, especially about the author. However, now that Rovzat ol-Muridin has been published, scholars will certainly raise some questions and answers about the work and its author, and by recognizing another legacy of mysticism, they will deepen and enrich this process. And certainly, in the future, there will be more discussion about the status of Ibn Yazdaniyar and the honor of Rovzat ol-Muridin. The "Rovzat ol-Muridin" is a mystical work that was probably written in the fourth century AH by Abu Ja'far ibn Yazdanyar Hamedani. The text of the work is prose and in Arabic. The book has 44 chapters, including the Khutbah al-Kitab. The subject of the work is purely mystical and reflects the mysticism before the Mongol invasion. In 1402 AH, Muhammad Suri and Nasrallah Pourjavadi corrected it from manuscripts and published it through the Contemporary Culture Publications. Until this date, the main mention and citation of this book was from manuscripts. This book has the following sections: A - Introduction; B - Text and then comments, appendices, notes, and index. The "Rovzat ol-Muridin" is one of the works that, in the history of our culture, were called "destiny" or "comprehensive" books; That is, they present a lot of information to the audience in a small book. The title of the first chapter is "Adab al-Sufiyyah" and the last chapter is "Shara'it al-Tasuf". The order of the chapters is neither alphabetical nor thematic; apparently, Ibn Yazdanyar narrates the material in that order according to the order and importance of the material from his point of view. The material of the chapters is short and concise and is presented in the form of 861 paragraphs. Ibn Yazdanyar, known as Qazi, was probably born in 380 in Forjard, Hamadan. Instead of Yazdanyar, in some sources, "Dinar, Daniyal, and Daniyar" are mentioned. We owe most of the information about him to his student Ibn Shirouyeh. Ibn Yazdanyar was a Shafi'i and, according to the classification of Sufis, he was from the people of Sahv. Sources such as Samani, Safadi, Haji Khalifa, Yaqut Hamavi, Rafi Qazvini, and most importantly, Zahabi have mentioned his circumstances in their works, and Suri and Pourjavadi have benefited from them. The compilers have mentioned 25 of Ibn Yazdanyar's teachers and have also introduced 5 of his students. Among the mystical sources, "Rovzat ol-Muridin" has a lot of affinity and similarity with the works of Solami, and some have even mistakenly considered this work to be a work attributed to Solami. Apart from Solami's works, there are similarities between this book and Sirjani's "Al-Bayyad wa al-Sawad". The method of expression in "Rovzat ol-Muridin" is that he first cites a verse or hadith and then retells his story. The method of expressing the story is mainly in a piecemeal manner; that is, he first refers to a story and then divides and enumerates it into various categories. In this book, Ibn Yazdanyar uses the "conjunction and" abundantly. Apart from this, the use of metaphor can also be considered another characteristic of the style. He has also used artificial infinitives in writing the book. The next topic is the main themes or topics of the book Rovzat ol-Muridin; apart from the general theme of "mysticism" in the work, we can mention the minor and subtle themes; the inability of reason to know God - a common theme in mystical texts -, special and unconventional claims; for example, in one case, he considers the clothing of Sufis to be the style of prophets, saints and righteous people. Although mysticism in this work is moderate and close to the Sharia, and there is no trace of the superficiality and arrogance of others in it, there are mostly exaggerated claims in it. Another topic is the criticism of the Sufis of the time. The next topic in the subject area of the work is the existence of contradictions in some of Ibn Yazdanyar's statements, a contradiction that is seen in the words and actions of most Sufis. The next section of this article examines the research of Suri and Pourjavadi; apparently, contrary to the sources and even the introduction of the name of the work and the author in the manuscripts, they added the suffix "Hamadani" to the end of the author's name. It should be noted that in mystical sources, there was another person with the nickname Ibn Yazdanyar who lived in the fourth century, and that person was Ibn Yazdanyar Ermavi. A scholar such as the late Zarrin Koob considered the two to be one and the same. Unfortunately, Suri and Pourjavadi did not enter into this matter and did not address it. In the manuscript section, the correctors have corrected the book based on 7 copies and have access to a total of 11 copies. The correctors' correction method was the method of Helmut Ritter, meaning that they included both the original text and the copied version. Although the correctors have taken great pains to correct and print the work and have introduced a little-known work to the scientific community, we can still see and list some minor shortcomings in the correctors' writings. First, in using and citing sources, the correctors have referred to sources whose date of composition was after the writing of the era of Rovzat ol-Muridin. However, they have tried to observe the correct way of referring and citing. Not paying attention to Ibn Yazdanyar, who is well-known in mystical books, namely Abu Bakr ibn Yazdanyar al-Urmavy, is another issue that is seen as a flaw in this book. Other minor issues, such as negligence in Arabization in some rare cases, can also be seen in this work.

Abstract This article critically analyzes the book “Discourse of the Left in Iran”. This book is a four-chapter book structured chronologically and causally as follows: 1) The Foundations of Left Discourse, 2) The Influence of Socialist Ideas, 3) The Rise of Communism in Iran, and 4) Arani and a New Chapter in Left Discourse. The article examines the articulation of left discourse in Iran based on the extent to which discursive elements are employed in the analysis of contemporary Iranian social history. By posing four key questions, it evaluates the methodological similarities and differences of this book concerning various historiographical approaches, including modern, social, political history, and discourse analysis. The findings indicate that the methodological heterogeneity of the book has affected its methodological coherence. Consequently, the text oscillates between traditional and modern historiography. Despite the book's title suggesting an engagement with critical discourse analysis, it at times aligns with social history and at other times with political history. The book "Discourse of the Left in Iran (Qajar and Pahlavi Period)", in four chapters, citing the available documents, defines how the Left movement of Iran was formed in opposition to feudalism and not capitalism. The author of the book considers Iran's Left discourse as a follower of the two Left schools of Russia and Western Europe, which have been modified from time to time and used differently due to their incompatibility with Iran's culture and politics. He considers political strangulation, migration of dissidents, migration of workers, economic incapacity, creation of space for the emergence of foreign intellectual currents, attention to modern education, and sending students to Russia and Western Europe to be among the factors influencing the Iranization of Left thought. The author of the book is trying to explain the Iranian left movement as an imported movement and discourse concerning Marxism, Communism, and the Russian Revolution that transforms depending on the intensity of influence of foreign factors. Today, referring to many studies about writing history in a new way and the topic of problematization, it is clear that all phenomena have a history, and at a certain point in time, due to demographic, social, and economic changes, they became a problem and are worth studying. On the other hand, history has become more controversial, questioning, and self-measuring, and it is not compatible with the assumption of knowing and believing in the truth or a unique history. Therefore, how the Left discourse emerges, or in other words, the zero moment of a discourse, is one of the fundamental topics of discourse analysis and a way of avoiding the narrative description of history. It means that if we understand the Left discourse as an imported current or even in historical continuity with previous uprisings, such as Khorramdinan, what becomes problematic is the history of rulers and governments, which is far from the critical method and discourse analysis. In narrative and holistic history, the multitude of events, resulting forces, procedures, and techniques of power and resistance are neglected, and taking phenomena for granted in the context of history due to not paying attention to how power is exercised causes a failure to understand how the concepts and strategies leading to the formation of the new regime of truth and the lack of cultural continuity of the phenomenon are constructed. At this point, social-political historiography in Iran needs to be revised and is facing many theoretical challenges because epistemological and methodological critical reflections in the form of stable criticism and evaluation have not been considered very seriously. Despite its successes in this field and paving the way for introspective theorizing about the movement and Left parties of Iran, this book has shortcomings, the most important of which is methodological disorder. This article examines the historical-scientific formulation of the book concerning modern and traditional history, social history, political history, and discourse analysis with four questions. The first question is: Is this research among modern or traditional historiography? The results of the research answer the first question as follows: although the term Discourse, arising from the critical paradigm creates the expectation of critical reading and modern historiography of the book in the reader, the author has chosen the traditional historiography method, which is the result of a series of causal relationships considering the present as an inevitable consequence of the past. The historian periodizes the past from the perspective of the present and explains the logic of historical developments. The second question is: Can the book be placed in the category of social historiography? The answer is as follows: the temporality of the text of the book is inextricably linked with history and the historical method, and cultural events are attached to their time and have a historical nature. Therefore, it seems that this writing is included in the category of conventional social historiography; but since the role of the people in all three areas of the relationship between the people and the people, the people with the government, and the people with their material and spiritual environment are ignored or weakly presented; it is not the life history of ordinary people and cannot be social historiography. In the third question, the relationship between the book and political historiography is examined. According to the definitions of traditional and new political history, the results indicate that: since it does not deal only with those in power and political issues; it cannot be a traditional political historiography, and because populations and groups outside of power and people's interactions with political power are not the priority of this book, and events, institutions and associations are examined in the shadow of major events and not in the space of discourse; it cannot be a new political history. In the end, in response to the fact that simply using the term discourse in the title and the word power in the text, is the research considered as discourse analysis? It should be said that regardless of whether the method of discourse analysis is constructivist, role-oriented, or critical, the audience expects to encounter a terminological text that examines the elements of discourse, such as propositions, subjects, institutions, and technologies, rather than the narrative and chronology aspect or the report-like sequence of events. The word discourse is used in this book without considering its theoretical foundations, and does not refer to any of the most important components of discourse (disruption, historical reversal, power, knowledge, power-knowledge network, resistance, problematization), and the critical aspect of analyzing a discourse has been neglected. It can be said that, according to the classification of information and the way of presenting the content in this book, perhaps the title of the book justifies the presence of multiple historical methods in the text.

Abstract Getting out of decadence is one of the major no.s of thought of contemporary thinkers of the Arab world. The gap between the current situation of the Arab world and the Western world and the recognition of the main factors of this and how to get out of it has been a matter of concern. Mohammad Abed Al-Jabari, one of the prominent thinkers of the 80s and 90s of the 20th century, made the knowledge of tradition and how to reproduce it in the new world the center of his thought. After authoring the book "Al-Khattab al-Arabi al-Mudhamdin" (Contemporary Arabic Discourse), he focused his research on explaining a method to criticize the Arabic intellect, which became one the most controversial no.s in the Arab world. In addition to giving a brief description of Mohammad Abid Jabri's project and the framework of his thinking about Shia and mysticism in Islamic history and culture, this article deals with the formulation of Arab thinkers' criticisms. The categorization of this critical view has been done based on the content, form and data of Jabri, which is remarkable for the inclusion of discussion and attention to his status in the Arab world. The main question of this article is the position of Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri among the thinkers of the Arab world. While expressing some of these criticisms, we judged them. Our method was descriptive analysis. The classification of these criticisms is in three levels: 1. Attitudinal-methodical criticism 2. Criticism of historical data 3. Criticism of structure. A purely structural view without considering the capacity of the Arab East to get out of the cultural situation of the new world while being influenced by Orientalists is one of the main problems of Jabri's project. The no. of overcoming decadence and stagnation has been a central concern for contemporary Arab thinkers, particularly in light of the perceived gap between the Arab world and the Western world in terms of intellectual, cultural, and socio-political development. This gap has been a source of deep introspection and debate among Arab intellectuals, who have sought to understand the root causes of this disparity and identify pathways to transcend it. The quest for intellectual and cultural revival has been a defining feature of modern Arab thought, with thinkers grappling with questions of identity, heritage, and modernity. Among these thinkers, Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri, a prominent philosopher and critic of the late 20th century, stands out for his rigorous engagement with the question of tradition (turath) and its role in shaping the modern Arab intellectual landscape. His work, particularly his critique of the Arab intellectual tradition, has sparked significant debate and controversy across the Arab world, making him a central figure in contemporary Arab thought. Al-Jabri’s intellectual project revolves around the critical examination of the Arab-Islamic heritage and its relevance to contemporary challenges. In his seminal work, "Al-Khattab al-Arabi al-Mudhamdin" (Contemporary Arabic Discourse), he lays the foundation for a methodological critique of the Arab intellect, aiming to deconstruct and reconstruct the ways in which Arab thought engages with its historical and cultural legacy. His approach is deeply analytical, seeking to identify the epistemological structures that have shaped Arab thought and to propose ways to reformulate these structures in a manner that aligns with the demands of modernity. Al-Jabri’s work is characterized by a commitment to rationalism and a critical reevaluation of the Arab intellectual tradition, which he believes has been hindered by uncritical adherence to outdated paradigms. This article explores Al-Jabri’s intellectual framework, focusing on his critique of the Arab intellectual tradition and his views on Shiism and mysticism within Islamic history and culture. It also examines the criticisms leveled against his project by other Arab thinkers, categorizing these critiques into three main levels: 1. Attitudinal-Methodical Criticism: This level addresses the philosophical and methodological assumptions underlying Al-Jabri’s work, questioning whether his approach adequately accounts for the diversity and complexity of Arab thought. Critics argue that his emphasis on rationalism and structural analysis may overlook the rich, multifaceted nature of Arab intellectual history, which encompasses not only rationalist traditions but also mystical, poetic, and philosophical currents. Some scholars contend that Al-Jabri’s method risks reducing the Arab intellectual tradition to a monolithic entity, ignoring its internal pluralism and dynamism. 2. Criticism of Historical Data: Here, the focus is on the accuracy and interpretation of the historical and cultural data Al-Jabri employs to support his arguments. Critics argue that his reading of history may be selective or overly influenced by Orientalist perspectives. For instance, his treatment of Shiism and mysticism has been criticized for being reductive and failing to fully appreciate their contributions to Islamic thought and culture. Additionally, some scholars question the extent to which Al-Jabri’s historical analysis is shaped by his own ideological commitments, which may lead to a biased or incomplete understanding of the past. 3. Structural Criticism: This level critiques the structural framework of Al-Jabri’s project, particularly his emphasis on a purely structural analysis that may overlook the dynamic and adaptive capacities of Arab culture in responding to modernity. Critics argue that his structuralist approach, while valuable in deconstructing existing paradigms, falls short in offering a clear, actionable roadmap for cultural and intellectual renewal. By focusing primarily on critique, Al-Jabri’s project is seen by some as lacking a constructive dimension that could guide the Arab world toward a more vibrant and inclusive intellectual future. One of the central criticisms of Al-Jabri’s work is his perceived reliance on a structuralist approach that fails to fully consider the potential of the Arab East to navigate its cultural and intellectual challenges. Critics argue that his project, while groundbreaking, may be limited by its overemphasis on deconstruction without offering a clear, actionable roadmap for cultural and intellectual renewal. Additionally, his engagement with Orientalist thought has been a point of contention, with some arguing that it inadvertently reinforces certain Eurocentric biases. This critique highlights the tension between Al-Jabri’s desire to critically engage with Western intellectual traditions and his commitment to reclaiming and redefining Arab thought on its own terms. The primary question this article seeks to address is: What is the position of Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri among the thinkers of the Arab world, and how do his ideas contribute to or complicate the discourse on Arab intellectual revival? Through a descriptive-analytical method, the article evaluates the strengths and limitations of Al-Jabri’s project, offering a nuanced judgment on his contributions to contemporary Arab thought. By categorizing and analyzing the criticisms of his work, the article highlights the ongoing relevance of his ideas while also pointing to areas where further intellectual engagement is needed. In conclusion, Al-Jabri’s project represents a significant attempt to bridge the gap between tradition and modernity in the Arab world. His critical examination of the Arab intellectual tradition has opened up new avenues for dialogue and reflection, challenging Arab thinkers to reevaluate their cultural and intellectual heritage. However, his work also raises important questions about the methods and frameworks best suited for addressing the complex challenges facing Arab thought today. By engaging critically with his ideas, this article contributes to a deeper understanding of the ongoing debates surrounding Arab intellectual revival and the role of tradition in shaping the future of the Arab world. Ultimately, Al-Jabri’s legacy lies in his ability to provoke thought and inspire a new generation of Arab intellectuals to grapple with the pressing no.s of their time.

Abstract Jeremy Waldron’s God, Locke, and Equality offers a fresh reading of John Locke’s political philosophy, emphasizing its theological foundations. Waldron argues that equality in Locke’s thought is not merely a legal or political concept but a theological principle, comprehensible only through the lens of humanity’s relationship with God. This paper situates Waldron’s work within ongoing interpretive debates on Locke, showing that his analysis occupies a central position in the long-standing contest between secular and theological readings of Locke. Waldron’s primary concern in revisiting Locke’s political thought is to establish a foundation for the idea of “fundamental equality,” a foundation that, in his view, contemporary secular approaches in political philosophy fail to justify. According to Waldron, Locke could articulate this principle only based on Christian belief and reference to God. The findings of this study indicate that, despite Waldron’s efforts, many enduring puzzles in Locke scholarship remain unresolved. Nonetheless, Waldron’s interpretive insight in highlighting the theological roots of Locke’s thought, and his creative use of this insight to illuminate the problem of fundamental equality, significantly enhances our understanding of the issue. Waldron’s analysis, despite the criticisms that reduce Locke’s liberalism to Protestant theology, underscores a critical point: any comprehensive understanding of Locke’s thought requires simultaneous attention to both its religious and political foundations. This article offers a critical examination of God, Locke, and Equality, a seminal work by contemporary philosopher and jurist Jeremy Waldron, recently translated into Persian. With an analytical and interpretive approach, the authors seek to present the book’s structure and central arguments while situating Waldron’s position within contemporary Locke scholarship. The principal focus lies in evaluating Waldron’s bold thesis that Locke’s commitment to “basic equality” is not merely compatible with Christian theology but in fact rests upon it, rendering secular accounts insufficient. In the opening sections, the authors outline Waldron’s intellectual background and the significance of his intervention. Unlike his predominantly legal writings, this book demonstrates Waldron’s engagement as a political and theological thinker. Grounded in the analytic tradition of Oxford yet influenced by Dworkinian moral reasoning, Waldron returns to Locke to probe a foundational question of modern political theory: on what basis can the equality of all human beings be morally justified? The structure of the book—divided into seven chapters—is reviewed in detail. Waldron interprets Locke not as a secular Enlightenment thinker, but as a deeply Christian philosopher whose political thought cannot be disentangled from theological commitments. From Locke’s reading of Genesis and the imago Dei, to his views on property, tolerance, slavery, and civil authority, each of these domains, Waldron argues, is intelligible only through the lens of Christian theological anthropology. A significant portion of the article is devoted to examining Waldron’s relation to key figures in Locke studies—John Dunn, Peter Laslett, Michael Zuckert, C.B. Macpherson, and Leo Strauss. Waldron is shown to follow Dunn in emphasizing Locke’s theological roots, while departing from both Laslett’s historicism and Strauss’s esotericism. Rejecting the notion that Locke’s religious claims are mere rhetorical devices, Waldron argues that such claims are substantive, foundational, and indispensable to Locke’s egalitarianism. The article further elaborates on Waldron’s distinction between "natural equality" and "political equality" in Locke’s theory. The former applies to all humans as created beings, while the latter is reserved for those with the rational capacity to understand and respond to divine commands. For Waldron, this is not a limitation, but rather a deepening of the moral structure of Locke’s thought, grounding equality in a theological rather than merely rationalist or utilitarian framework. Nonetheless, the article also surveys key criticisms of Waldron’s thesis. Critics such as Victor Nuovo argue that the book lacks originality, merely reaffirming claims made decades ago. Others accuse Waldron of selective interpretation—forcing all aspects of Locke’s thought into a theological mold, downplaying tensions, and failing to grapple adequately with Locke’s ambivalence on issues such as women, class, and slavery. Furthermore, Waldron’s anti-historicist methodology, though consistent, is seen by some as overly rigid and prone to decontextualization. The article also includes a critique of the Persian translation of the book, noting various terminological ambiguities and questionable equivalencies that may obscure some of Waldron’s philosophical nuances. In conclusion, the authors argue that God, Locke, and Equality are of significant value to contemporary political theory and theology, particularly within Persian intellectual contexts. It revives serious engagement with the theological substratum of liberal equality and challenges prevailing secular assumptions in political philosophy. For Iranian scholars, Waldron’s approach serves as a methodological exemplar of how to read canonical texts non-anachronistically and with theological attentiveness. Moreover, the book resonates with enduring questions within Islamic political thought regarding divine sovereignty, gender roles, political authority, and the foundations of human dignity and rights. Despite its limitations, Waldron’s work represents an essential contribution to both Locke scholarship and the broader discourse on religion and liberalism. It reminds us that foundational concepts such as equality cannot be fully grasped in abstraction from the religious traditions that shaped them. Whether or not one accepts Waldron’s theological commitments, his interpretive project compels a reevaluation of the moral underpinnings of modern liberal thought.