Pizhuhish nāmah-i intiqādī-i mutūn va barnāmah hā-yi ̒ulūm-i insāni (Critical Studies in Texts & Programs of Human Sciences)

Abstract The book “Early Islam and the birth of Capitalism” is significant for the author's historical approach, which attributes the origins of capitalism not to the West, but to the economic and commercial structures of Arab society before and after Islam. However, the historical data, arguments, premises, and conclusions presented in the book are insufficient to support such a hypothesis and reflect a lack of historical knowledge on the part of the author. This article focuses on the concept of trade—which, according to the author, is the most significant link to the emergence of capitalism—and offers a critical analysis of the book, aiming to assess the extent to which its arguments align with historical realities. The findings of this study indicate that the author's analysis of the connection between Arab trade and the rise of capitalism lacks historical accuracy and coherence, due to insufficient attention to the social and cultural context of pre-Islamic Arab society, Islamic economic traditions and values, and the broader history of global trade among other civilizations such as Greece and Rome. As a result, the author's conclusions prove to be unsuccessful. A comprehensive examination of the economy—particularly trade—in early Islam necessitates an in-depth analysis of the capacities and constraints of various regions within the Arabian Peninsula, the historical context of Islamic societies from the Peninsula to Baghdad, pre-Islamic economic traditions, religious teachings and economic regulations introduced during the Islamic era, as well as the intricate interrelations between economy, culture, politics, and society. The book “Early Islam and the Birth of Capitalism” by Benedikt Koehler seeks to trace the historical roots of capitalism in the early Islamic period by highlighting the role of Arab trade, the economic activities of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the caliphs, economic institutions, and managerial practices of that era. However, these analyses suffer from serious flaws due to historical inaccuracies and methodological weaknesses. The author claims that the Arabs were the pioneers of global trade and capitalism, and that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) exemplified the wealthy merchant ideal. However, this perspective contradicts historical evidence. In reality, the economic role of the Arabs—particularly in the Hijaz region during the pre-Islamic and early Islamic periods—was limited and tribal in nature. Advanced maritime trade and global commerce were characteristic of earlier civilizations such as Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, the Phoenicians, the Persians, the Greeks, and the Romans. The Arabs' connections to the Persian and Roman empires were largely mediated through intermediary states like the Nabataeans, Palmyra, and al-Hirah. Prior to Islam, the Arabs of the Hijaz lacked modern economic institutions and were not significantly engaged in international trade. During the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, maritime trade flourished as Muslims gained control over major trade routes and key ports. Navigational techniques were transmitted to the Arabs from the Persians and Romans. However, these developments occurred after the early Islamic period and belong to later historical phases. Therefore, the claim that global trade was pioneered by the Arabs of early Islam is inaccurate and stems from a lack of historical awareness. The author places strong emphasis on the Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) commercial experience, claiming he had over 30 years of trade involvement and even devised economic laws. However, historical sources do not support this assertion. The Prophet’s trade journeys were limited, often unclear, and mostly took place before his prophetic mission. Citing Quranic verses to prove that trade was the Prophet’s primary occupation is misleading, as these verses mainly reflect the criticisms of the polytheists and do not indicate a sustained professional engagement in commerce. The commercial activities of the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman) are also exaggerated in the book. During their caliphates, the primary focus was on military conquests and the consolidation of power, leaving little room for international trade agreements. The real flourishing of trade occurred later, particularly during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, especially under the reigns of Harun al-Rashid and al-Ma'mun, with Baghdad as a central hub. One of the positive aspects of the book is its attention to the coinage reform introduced by Abdu al-Malik and its impact on the Muslim economy. However, the claim that the Romans held a monopoly on minting gold coins, and that the Sassanid’s were afraid to break this monopoly, does not align with historical evidence. Sassanid dinars were already circulating among the Arabs, and early Islamic coins were modeled on these pre-existing Sassanid designs. The discussion of Islamic banking, which the author presents as a major economic innovation of Muslims, actually traces its roots to the Iranian divan-e jahbaz (treasury system). It was through the presence of Iranians in the Abbasid bureaucratic apparatus that many of Iran’s economic and administrative structures were transferred into the Islamic world. The book also mentions the view that Europeans during the Middle Ages were unaware of the profitability of trade and wealth accumulation for a long time and that they acquired this knowledge from Muslims. This perspective contradicts the historical background of trade in Greek, Roman, and Carthaginian civilizations, which featured organized markets, regulations, and control over trade routes. The Romans and Greeks engaged in significant commercial activities in European ports and North Africa well before the advent of Islam. Finally, the author, relying on later Islamic sources, traces the roots of capitalism to the commercial structure of pre-Islamic Mecca and compares it to the corporate structures of Italian republics like Venice, which is a flawed analogy. Mecca’s social structure was tribal and familial, and its economy was primarily subsistence-based and founded on tribal trust—not commercial companies with profit and loss sharing and risk management. Capitalist institutions and tools such as insurance, capital markets, and organized corporations were invented by Europeans, especially the Venetians. Islamic religious institutions like waqf (endowments) and charitable funds had social and spiritual goals, rather than purely economic and profit-driven purposes. The transfer of commercial knowledge and experiences from Muslims to Europe, especially to Venice, is a historical fact; however, this transfer occurred within a different cultural and social context. Europeans developed this knowledge further, steering it toward modern capitalism—a cultural and structural difference that the book does not adequately address. In general, the book's analysis of the role of Islam and Muslims in the emergence of capitalism has led to inaccurate and simplistic analyses due to neglect of the historical, cultural, and structural contexts of Islamic societies and historical complexities.

Abstract This article examines and critiques Stuart Hall's book "Meaning, Culture, and Social Life" through a descriptive-analytical method. The main focus of the book is the examination of what meaning, culture, and their relationship with social-political life are. The analysis shows that despite the importance of the book, the translation of part of the English text, which is merely an introduction to the main discussion, as well as formal and content-related deficiencies such as not including footnotes for terms and proper names, writing errors, weaknesses in equivalency selection, and a lack of consistency in the translation detract from its value. Hall, influenced by Gramsci, expands the concept of hegemony from class domination to discursive struggle in culture and media. Unlike Edward Said, who sees representation as a tool for Western dominance over the East, Hall views it as fluid and resistible. According to Hall, there are also criticisms regarding his writing and analytical style and methodology, which sometimes lead readers to face difficulties in reading and understanding his works. Other criticisms that can be written about him include a fluid and reductionist view of culture and ignoring historical, social, and economic structures. Despite all this, in the age of digital capitalism, Stuart Hall's perspective remains very important and fundamental as a beacon of hope in today's social struggles. The book Meaning, Culture, and Social Life by Stuart Hall is one of the foundational works in the field of cultural studies and the sociology of culture. It is part of the volume Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, which was compiled by Hall and translated into Persian by Ahmad Golmohammadi in 2012. This article, using a descriptive-analytical approach, aims to introduce, critique, and analyze this work. Focusing on its Persian translation, the study investigates the book’s theoretical, structural, and content dimensions, as well as Stuart Hall’s perspectives. The book under review analyzes the mechanisms of meaning production and circulation in society, focusing on concepts such as 'meaning', 'culture', 'representation', 'semiotics', and 'subject'. Hall argues that meaning is not an inherent and fixed matter, but rather a product of interaction among sign systems, discourses, and social-historical contexts. Within this framework, language is regarded not merely as a tool for communication, but as a fundamental mechanism for the production of meaning and identity. Representation is also an active, meaning-making, and discursive process through which images, narratives, and ideologies influence mentalities and social structures. The article also points out several criticisms of the book. The translated version includes only the introduction and first chapter of the original text, while the main discussions on representation, developed in later chapters by various authors, are absent. This omission prevents Persian readers from gaining a comprehensive theoretical understanding. Another fundamental critique of the original book is the repetition of certain ideas by the author, which has led the translator to replicate this flaw in the translator’s note. In terms of form, the translation also suffers from shortcomings, including the absence of footnotes for technical terms, unfamiliar equivalents (e.g., “constructivism,” “representation”), improper use of spacing (half-space), and inconsistency in Persian equivalents for essential concepts. Furthermore, Hall's perspective and his book have criticisms that are mentioned below: Critique of writing style-analytical: Hall's prose is complex, specialized, and dense; making it difficult and incomprehensible for newcomers to cultural theory. At the analytical level, Hall relies heavily on structuralism (Saussure, Foucault, Althusser), which emphasizes discourse and ideology at the expense of ignoring lived experiences and empirical data. Additionally, concepts such as articulation, over determination, and signifying practices lack precise definitions. This leads to theoretical ambiguity and difficulty in operationalizing them in empirical research. Methodological critique: From a methodological perspective, Hall's theories provide rich conceptual tools but lack systematic solutions for empirical analysis. His semiotic and discursive analyses, without offering clear steps or research guidelines, are deemed ineffective for empirical researchers. Moreover, in combining the tradition of culturalism and structuralism, Hall has only emphasized differences and has not succeeded in providing a coherent methodological synthesis. Critique of the book 'Representation' and theoretical content: The book 'Representation' excels in the recontextualization of representation, but it performs poorly in practical and educational applications, with a greater focus on meaning production by power institutions rather than audience reception. Additionally, in the early chapters of the book, hybrid dimensions such as race, gender, class, and decolonization are not effectively considered, whereas these dimensions are highlighted in Hall's later works. The authors of the relevant article have criticized Hall's viewpoint from several angles: Political reductionism: Hall primarily analyzes culture as an ideological and political matter, neglecting its aesthetic, emotional, and affective dimensions. Ignoring individual agency: Hall's emphasis on structures has diminished the role of everyday actions and social interactions in the production of meaning and culture. Extreme fluidity: Although Hall highlights the fluidity of meaning and culture, neglecting fixed and stable cultural concepts (such as respect and honesty) can create a relativistic and imprecise perspective. Eurocentrism and limited generalizability: Hall's analytical framework is largely focused on the socio-historical context of Britain and is not directly applicable to non-Western societies or contemporary times (the age of artificial intelligence). The article also draws comparisons between Hall and thinkers such as Gramsci and Edward Said. Influenced by Gramsci, Hall extends the concept of hegemony into the realm of culture and media and applies it to the analysis of contemporary discourses like Thatcherism and racism. Regarding representation, Hall describes it as a multilayered process with potential for resistance and identity reconstruction. In contrast, Edward Said, in Orientalism, considers representation a tool of Western colonial domination over the East. In conclusion, while "Meaning, Culture, and Social Life" contains only the initial section of a broader work, it plays a crucial role in familiarizing Persian-speaking readers with Stuart Hall’s thought. This work offers profound insights into how meaning is formed, the role of representation, and the interaction between culture and power. It is particularly valuable for students and researchers in the fields of social sciences, communication, and media studies. Despite the critiques of the translated book and Hall's perspective as well as the book Representation, his importance and influence in cultural studies, media, and sociology remain steadfast, and his views are still considered guiding and inspiring in the digital capitalist era.

Abstract The present article seeks to critically analyze the dominant dualistic perspective in most theories of the humanities and social sciences through an interdisciplinary approach inspired by psychoanalysis, sociology, and theoretical mysticism. To do this, it first gives a psychoanalytic narrative of the emergence of the subject. Then, it argues that the main problem of the dualistic perspective is that through the amnesia of the moment of separation from being, subjectivity—as a secondary, temporary, yet necessary form of knowledge—illusively replaces true ontology, and then attempts to explain external reality based on the subject-object dualism. The article then, relying on the later works of Simmel, refutes the idea that the experience of unity with being is impossible in the post-Oedipal world. This becomes possible through Simmel’s neo-Kantian reading of Kant’s idea that the subject-object boundary can be suspended in the aesthetic realm. Accordingly, Simmel considers the suspension of the dualistic subject-object relationship feasible at the social and political levels as well. The article further introduces the concept of “transgression” and attempts to explore the suspension of this dualism through the sociological concepts of “I” and “me” from Mead, as well as through a mystical reading based on the thoughts of Ibn Arabi and Rumi. The present article seeks to critically analyze the dominant dualistic perspective that governs most theories in the humanities and social sciences, specifically the paradigm of “social constructionism” in theories of social sciences and “ego psychology” in psychological theories. It adopts an interdisciplinary approach inspired by psychoanalysis, sociology, and theoretical mysticism. The discussion begins with a psychoanalytic narrative of the birth of the subject, through which the problem of the article is introduced. This psychoanalytic narrative starts with what is known as the “oceanic feeling”—a sense of unity the infant experiences in the womb through physical fusion with the mother, and which continues after birth, not physically but psychically, for several months. With the formation of the ego (subjectivity), the infant undergoes a symbolic experience of “separation” or, metaphorically, “death.” Over time, however, this moment of separation is repressed and denied, as if the infant had never experienced it, as if the unity with being had never occurred—as if the separation of subject and object were an eternal truth rather than the result of necessity. What is forgotten here is that subjectivity was supposed to generate a minimal degree of “fixity”—by accepting the moment of separation—so that overcoming the obstacles to full satisfaction could become possible. Instead, the illusion arises that one was born in the post-Oedipal age. The emergence of modernity and the dominance of its central signifier—namely, the subject-object dualism—across all human knowledge led to this illusion being legitimized under the name of “science.” This article argues that the fundamental problem of the modern dualistic perspective is that, by forgetting the moment of separation from being, subjectivity—though secondary, temporary, and necessary—illusively replaces true ontology. It then attempts to explain external reality based on the dualism of subject and object. The article, by relying on the later works of Georg Simmel, refutes the idea that the experience of unity with being is impossible in the post-Oedipal world. Instead, it proposes the possibility of a non-dualistic experience. Drawing on Simmel's concept of “transgression,” the article demonstrates that the suspension of this dualism is also possible on a social level. Simmel conceives of society as a work of art, and through Kant’s distinction between the epistemological and aesthetic realms, he considers the suspension of the subject-object dualism socially feasible. The article then engages George Herbert Mead’s sociological theories, using the concept of “transgression” as a means to overcome dualism and reach a non-dualistic perspective. Mead, through the concept of the “I,” seeks to account for an aspect of the self that is not socially constructed—a space in which “transgression” becomes possible. The article subsequently explores how the suspension of the subject-object dualism can also be approached through theoretical mysticism. It discusses how concepts like rebellion and disobedience relate to “transgression” as a way of transcending dualistic perspectives. To this end, the article turns to the works of two prominent thinkers in Islamic theoretical mysticism: Ibn Arabi and Rumi, analyzing how the concept of rebellion plays a role in suspending the subject-object binary. Islamic mysticism, rooted in a unifying ontology of divine unity, critiques and rejects Cartesian dualism. Cartesian dualism, which underpins the dominant epistemology of modern thought, reduces reality to binaries such as subject-object, self-world, and mind-body. Theoretical mysticism, however, rejects these binaries, considering them human perceptual constructs. Instead, it proposes that all dualities dissolve in the unity of the Divine. Islamic theoretical mysticism, through the concepts of rebellion and transgression, and by reinterpreting the mythic story of Adam, challenges dualistic frameworks and offers a holistic view of reality. In mystical thought, all of being is seen as a manifestation of one light, and thus a non-dualistic perspective is constantly at work. In this tradition, Adam’s consumption of the forbidden fruit is not seen as a sin but as the moment of “transgression”—a moment that, through the lens of modern philosophy, can be understood as the birth of subjectivity. Yet the point is that just as the formation of ego and subjectivity should not, on a psychoanalytic level, be mistakenly taken as a “true” necessity—when in fact it is an illusory necessity for constructing a coherent narrative of the self—so too, on a social level, the formation of the subject should not be seen as an inherent truth, but as a secondary and temporary construct that creates a minimal degree of fixity for the continuation of life. In conclusion, modern knowledge has emerged from the clashes of social, political, and economic forces acting upon human beings. However, the dominant modern dualistic perspective in the humanities and social sciences illusively treats this condition as a universal truth.

Abstract “Reflexive modernity” is a new concept that has important theoretical implications. This concept was first introduced in a work titled “Reflexive Modernity: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order” by Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, and Scott Lash. This article attempts to examine the hidden aspects of the new modernity through a critique and interpretation of the central idea of this work and to show how the positive idea of reflexive modernity can be a precursor to the emergence of a negative and crisis-ridden concept of modernity. This article is organized at three levels of description, analysis, and reflection: first, at the descriptive level, we introduce the main elements that constitute “reflexive modernity.” Second, at the analytical level, we try to look at “between the lines,” in Leo Strauss’s terms, and reveal the hidden aspects of this idea. Here, we will show that in the conceptualizations made, there are always two competing scenarios: a positive and ideal scenario and a negative and anti-ideal scenario. The first scenario seems to be the overt and covert approach of this idea. Finally, as a reflection, we will discuss the idea of “crisis-ridden modernity” and show how, in the shadow of the increasing strengthening of modernism, we are witnessing the increasing weakening of modernity. “Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order” is considered one of the most important scientific works on modernity, in which Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, and Scott Lash, three of the world's most prominent sociologists, attempt to answer fundamental questions about modernity. They believe that today's modernity is fundamentally different from classical modernity and is different in nature and mechanism. Reflexive modernity is a new era; an era in which modern man pauses on the path of modernization and contemplates the fears and hopes ahead; he contemplates the victories and defeats of the past and resumes his path in a reflexive and revisionist manner. This work shows that in the new era, our understanding of politics, tradition, nature, and society has undergone major changes. In this work, a new theory of reflexive modernity is proposed. The authors of this book pursue two main goals by proposing this theory: first, to create a new orientation in sociology and second, to create an institutional counterpoint to postmodern theory. Therefore, it can be said that postmodernism relies on the deconstruction of modern social understanding, but reflexive modernity offers a reconstructive view. This theory, focusing on new social relations in the West, is also influenced by the theories of postindustrial society and postmaterialist society. With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the so-called Eastern Bloc, the globalization of capitalism, and the advancement of technology, a new formation of the contemporary world order has emerged, and social life and the natural environment have undergone radical transformations and metamorphoses. In this new era, the concept of modernity has become more distant from its classical version. Although these authors have different opinions on various issues, the starting point of their discussion is the emergence of a new type of modernity, which they call "reflexive modernity." The central idea of their discussion is based on the transition in the modern. This means that the era of simple or classical modernity has ended and we are witnessing the beginning of the era of reflexive or late modernity. The concept of reflexive modernity is of great theoretical importance and evaluates contemporary developments through the lens of developments in modernity. As we know, the emergence of classical modernity is considered a point of rupture from the static state of tradition and an end to the reproducing society. In fact, the emergence of the modern is accompanied by important “endings” and “beginnings,” and the fate of the modernity project can change the fate of social developments on a global scale. Reflexive modernity establishes a different relationship with tradition. In fact, if classical modernity identified itself in opposition to tradition, now reflexive modernity identifies itself not in opposition to tradition but in dialogue with it. The concept of “risk society” in Beck, the concept of “institutional rethinking” and “post-traditional society” in Giddens, and the concept of “community rethinking” and “reflexive traditionalization” in Scott Lash all refer to establishing an epistemological dialogue between tradition and modernity. Of course, it is worth remembering that Beck, Giddens, and Lash published their theory under the original title of “reflexive modernization,” but in the core and text of the theory, it can be easily seen that they are talking more than anything about a kind of ideal called “reflexive modernity.” The review of the aforementioned book is based on the methodology of text analysis and includes three stages of description, analysis and criticism. Based on this method, first the objective information of the work is transmitted, then we try to examine the structures and meanings, and finally, based on evidence-based judgment, we will analyze the hidden aspects in the authors' theory and based on that we will formulate the critical theory in the context of simple modernity. Based on what has been said, the type of this research is qualitative, its approach is critical, and its data collection method is based on library and documentary. In the following, after presenting the theoretical background, we first provide a comprehensive description of the concept of reflexive modernity, then analyze this concept, and finally, based on the analysis presented, we will criticize and propose the new concept of "crisis-ridden modernity". In concluding part, I should mention that the article has criticized and examined the idea of reflexive modernity at three levels and finally concluded that the book has misunderstandings about the nature and essence of the modernity, so the book mainly talks about modernism and wrongly affiliates the attributions of modernism to modernity. Modernity per se has nothing to do with the triumph of technology and capitalism directly. Modernity first and foremost has constructed on two main bases: human rationality or even wisdom and human rights. While Modernism is about conversion to “the modern”. This conversion takes many forms. In its most radical form, modernism can become an ideological conception of modernity that attempts to present the experience of Western modernization as the only path to modernization and to extend it to the entire world, a conception that ultimately leads to imperialism. In its most moderate form, modernism is a tendency to realize the modern within the traditional contexts of collective life. Here, we see that modernism is more concerned with the outward practices of the modern. Rather than being an existential and essential process, it is a pragmatic and formalistic practice. The article, by proposing the concept of crisis-ridden modernity has attempted to reveal the hidden aspects of reflexive modernity. Under the concept of crisis-ridden modernity, it has been argued that the two main foundations of modernity have been undermined under the hegemony of modernism, and this has subjected modern individuality to an epistemological crisis. Reflexive modernity finds meaning in the shadow of a global super trend; a super trend that sociologists call “individualization.” This super trend can take two completely different directions. On the one hand, it can lead to individualization and strengthen modernity. On the other hand, it can lead to de-individuation and subject modernity to an epistemological crisis.

Abstract John Austin (1790-1859), an English jurist and legal philosopher, played an unparalleled role in the establishment of jurisprudence as an independent science. Emphasizing positive law as the object of legal science and the analytical-conceptual method as its method of study, Austin, in his book "The Province of Jurisprudence Determined", paved the way for transforming law into an autonomous discipline. This article employs an analytical-conceptual approach to examine Austin's thought on the foundation of legal science. To this end, while reviewing Austin's life and times, the necessity of defining the province of jurisprudence and its distinction from other normative domains is explained. Subsequently, by elucidating the distinction between "law" and "the science of law," the difference between the natural object and the legal object, and positive law as the object of legal science, the concepts of sovereign and sovereignty in Austin's thought, and the issue of the validity of law and "habit of obedience" in the command theory of law are addressed. Then, Austin's separation of law from morality is examined, and his project for transforming law into an independent science is described. The results of this research show that, despite all the criticisms leveled against him, Austin, by putting forward this idea, paved the way for the independence of legal science and its transformation into a distinct discipline, and his legacy remains alive and dynamic in legal discourse. This article examines the foundational contribution of John Austin (1790-1859), the English jurist and legal philosopher, to the establishment of jurisprudence as an independent scientific discipline. Specifically, it focuses on his seminal work, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, to analyze how Austin sought to demarcate the boundaries of legal science, separating it from morality, religion, and politics, and thereby establishing it as a distinct field of study with its own object and method. The article argues that, despite significant criticisms, Austin's project laid the groundwork for the analytical tradition in legal philosophy and continues to influence contemporary legal thought. The article begins by acknowledging Austin's pivotal role in the development of legal positivism and analytical jurisprudence. It highlights his motivation: to create a science of law, analogous to the burgeoning natural sciences of his time, that would be capable of describing and analyzing legal phenomena in a systematic and objective manner. This ambition required a clear definition of the object of legal science and a specific method for its study. The prevailing situation in 19th-century England, where law was intertwined with moral and religious considerations, presented a significant obstacle to this project. Biographical and Historical Context To understand Austin's intellectual project, the article provides a concise biographical overview. Austin's early life, his military service, his unsuccessful legal career, and his crucial engagement with the Utilitarian thinkers Jeremy Bentham and James Mill are all discussed. This context is vital for understanding his commitment to a scientific, value-free approach to law. His time spent studying law in Germany, where he encountered a more systematic and principle-based approach to legal education, further shaped his vision for a distinct science of jurisprudence. His frustrating experience teaching at the newly founded University of London, culminating in the publication of "The Province of Jurisprudence Determined" in 1832, is presented as a critical turning point. The article emphasizes that while the book was not initially well-received, it later became a cornerstone of legal philosophy. The Necessity of Defining the Province of Jurisprudence The article then explores the core problem Austin addressed: the lack of a clearly defined domain for legal studies. Before Austin, legal inquiry was often conflated with moral philosophy, theology, and political theory. This lack of differentiation, the article argues, hindered the development of a truly scientific understanding of law. Austin recognized that, mirroring the natural sciences, a science of law required a specific object of study and a method distinct from other normative domains. He sought to achieve this by distinguishing between "law" as a social phenomenon and the "science of law" as a systematic study of that phenomenon. This separation is analogous to the separation of the object of study of politics from political science that Machiavelli undertook. It should also be added that, Austin's project had a direct and significant impact on the project of Hans Kelsen, who is considered to be the most prominent legal positivist of the 20th century. Austin's Argument in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined The heart of the article provides a detailed, six-step reconstruction of Austin's argument in "The Province of Jurisprudence Determined". Distinguishing "Law" and "Science of Law": The article emphasizes the crucial distinction Austin makes between the existence of law (a social fact) and the scientific study of law. This is the foundational move that allows for the possibility of an independent legal science. The Difference Between Natural and Legal Objects: The article highlights Austin's (implicit) recognition that legal objects, unlike natural objects, are not immediately given to experience. They are constructs shaped by human will and require a specific criterion for their identification as legal phenomena. This point, drawing on interpretations like Tropper's, underscores the complexity of establishing a science of law. Positive Law as the Object of Legal Science: Austin's solution to this problem is to identify "positive law" – law "posited" by a human sovereign – as the proper object of legal science. The article explains Austin's definition of positive law as the command of a sovereign, backed by the threat of sanction, directed to rational beings. It emphasizes that this definition focuses on the form of law (command, sovereign, sanction) rather than its moral content. It is also clarified that Austin's view of positive law also includes Divine Laws. The Concepts of Sovereign and Sovereignty: The article delves into Austin's definitions of "sovereign" and "sovereignty," emphasizing their empirical and relational nature. A sovereign is a determinate person or body of persons habitually obeyed by the bulk of a society, but not habitually obeying any other earthly superior. This definition anchors the concept of sovereignty in observable social facts, avoiding metaphysical or moral justifications. The Problem of Legal Validity and "Habit of Obedience": The article addresses a central criticism of Austin's command theory: the distinction between a sovereign's command and the threat of a gunman. It argues that the concept of "habit of obedience" is crucial here. Drawing on interpretations like Rodney's, the abstract suggests that "habit" implies a regularity and acceptance that goes beyond mere coercion. Furthermore, it connects this concept to Austin's (modified) utilitarianism, suggesting that the sovereign's commands must, at least broadly, align with the perceived utility of the governed to generate habitual obedience. Although it should be mentioned that this utilitarian aspect of Austin's thought was not as influential as other aspects. This section is strengthened by explicitly contrasting mere coercion with legitimate authority, a key distinction for understanding Austin's project. The Separation of Law and Morality: The article explains Austin's famous "separation thesis" – the claim that the existence of law is one thing, its merit or demerit another. It clarifies that this is not a claim that law should be amoral, but rather a methodological assertion that the science of jurisprudence is concerned with describing law as it is, not as it ought to be. The task of evaluating law's morality belongs to the science of legislation or ethics, not to jurisprudence itself. The Blueprint for an Independent Science of Law The article concludes by outlining how Austin, through these steps, constructed a blueprint for an independent science of law. He distinguished between "general jurisprudence" (the study of concepts common to all legal systems) and "particular jurisprudence" (the study of specific legal systems). His focus on positive law, the command theory, and the separation thesis provided a framework for analyzing legal phenomena in a purportedly objective and value-free manner. Legacy and Criticisms: The article acknowledges the significant criticisms leveled against Austin's theory, particularly from figures like H.L.A. Hart. Hart's critique, focusing on the inadequacy of the command theory to account for legal continuity, power-conferring rules, and the internal point of view of legal actors, is briefly mentioned. The article also gestures towards other critical perspectives, such as legal realism (which emphasizes the role of social and political factors in judicial decision-making) and feminist legal theory (which critiques the gendered assumptions often embedded in traditional legal thought). It could add a brief contrast of feminist and legal realist viewpoints versus that of Austin. Despite these criticisms, the article emphasizes Austin's enduring legacy. His work marked a decisive break from earlier, less systematic approaches to legal study. He established jurisprudence as a distinct academic discipline with its own object of study, method, and conceptual framework. While contemporary legal philosophy has moved beyond Austin in many respects, his work remains a crucial starting point for understanding the nature of law and the challenges of legal theory. The article concludes by suggesting that Austin's ideas continue to be relevant in contemporary debates about the nature of international law, the role of judges, and the relationship between law and technology, underlining his lasting impact on legal thought.

Abstract This paper presents an analytical and critical review of “Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’ Meditations” by Cecilia Wee (2006), a study devoted to one of the most intricate and overlooked issues in Cartesian philosophy—the notion of material falsity. The book distinguishes between “static” and “dynamic” interpretations of materially false ideas, arguing that Descartes’s understanding of material falsity evolves throughout the Meditations in accordance with his epistemological progress. While Wee’s “dynamic interpretation” is innovative in emphasizing the transformative process of Descartes’s inquiry, it raises significant philosophical challenges. The findings suggest that although Wee’s approach revitalizes the discussion of material falsity and highlights the evolving nature of Descartes’s thought, it remains conceptually ambiguous concerning the representational mechanism of materially false ideas and their relation to truth and epistemic agency. The concept of material falsity in Descartes’s philosophy represents one of the most intricate yet foundational topics in early modern epistemology. Although mentioned briefly in the ‘’Third Meditation, it raises profound questions about the relationship between perception, representation, truth, and cognitive agency. Despite its central importance, the notion has rarely been explored in isolation. Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’ Meditations by Cecilia Wee (2006) constitutes the first systematic monograph devoted to this issue. The book examines how Descartes distinguishes material falsity—a kind of error occurring at the level of ideas—from formal falsity, which belongs to the level of judgment. According to Descartes, the human mind may form sensory ideas that represent what does not in fact exist, such as the perception of cold as a positive quality rather than the absence of heat. This seemingly minor point becomes a window into the larger structure of Cartesian epistemology. Wee’s interpretation is built upon two contrasting hermeneutic models: the static and the dynamic interpretations of materially false ideas. The static model, defended by classical commentators such as Margaret Wilson, Alanen, and Normore, treats material falsity as a fixed notion defined once and for all in ‘’the Third Meditation. By contrast, Wee’s dynamic interpretation argues that Descartes’s understanding of material falsity evolves throughout ‘’the Six Meditations, in parallel with the progressive unfolding of his epistemological and metaphysical insights. In her view, material falsity is not merely a local problem about sensory error but a conceptual thread that connects Descartes’s theory of perception, his metaphysical proofs of God, and even his moral reflections on the relation between finite human will and divine perfection. The originality of Wee’s reading lies in emphasizing this developmental dimension of Descartes’s philosophy. She contends that Descartes continually reconstructs his key concepts rather than employing them statically. Thus, the meaning of material falsity changes in accordance with the thinker’s own progression from doubt to knowledge, from epistemology to metaphysics, and ultimately to ethics. In this sense, the Meditations themselves represent a process of conceptual transformation rather than a mere sequence of arguments. In developing her case, Wee turns to late Scholastic sources, particularly Suárez’s Disputationes Metaphysicae, in order to trace the historical roots of the notion. She argues that Descartes adopted the term material falsity from the Scholastic tradition but radically reinterpreted it within a new metaphysical framework. Whereas Suárez defined material falsity as a lack of correspondence between a representation and its object, Descartes redefines it as a failure in the representational function of an idea—a breakdown in how an idea presents its supposed object to the mind. This shift reflects Descartes’s broader move from Aristotelian ontology to a representational epistemology centered on the thinking subject. While Wee’s reconstruction is conceptually rich and historically informed, it faces several philosophical difficulties. First, her extension of material falsity beyond the ‘’Third Meditation’’—to encompass metaphysical and ethical dimensions—appears to overreach the textual evidence. Descartes himself confines the analysis of materially false ideas to the stage of epistemological reflection, where the focus remains on the nature of sensory representation rather than on divine justice or human morality. Second, Wee’s treatment sometimes blurs the distinction between ideas and judgments. For Descartes, falsity properly belongs to the act of judgment, not to the mere presence of ideas in the intellect. Ideas may serve as the matter of error, but they are not themselves false or true except in this derivative sense. Consequently, the dynamic interpretation, while illuminating the continuity of Descartes’s thought, introduces a conceptual ambiguity by treating material falsity as both epistemic and moral in nature. Nevertheless, Wee’s work succeeds in repositioning the problem of material falsity at the center of Cartesian studies. Her analysis shows that without understanding this notion, one cannot fully grasp how Descartes connects error, will, and understanding in his theory of knowledge. The idea of material falsity functions as a revealing mirror of the human mind’s finitude: it marks the boundary where finite cognitive capacity encounters the infinite perfection of God. In this sense, error becomes not merely a defect but a moment of philosophical revelation—an indication of the tension between finite and infinite understanding that underlies the entire Cartesian project. From a methodological standpoint, Wee’s book stands out for combining conceptual analysis with historical reconstruction. She situates Descartes within the intellectual continuum linking the late Scholastics to the early modern rationalists, highlighting the transformation of metaphysical language in the transition from theological to epistemological frameworks. However, some methodological inconsistencies remain. In several chapters, especially the later ones, Wee’s discussion tends to shift from analytical exposition to textual commentary, resulting in occasional repetition and a lack of systematic closure. The book would benefit from a final integrative chapter summarizing its philosophical implications—a point noted by reviewers such as Raffaella De Rosa. Despite these shortcomings, the dynamic interpretation proposed by Wee offers valuable hermeneutic insights. It reminds readers that Descartes’s Meditations should be read not as a static system of theses but as a living process of intellectual self-formation. Through this lens, material falsity is redefined as a philosophical moment of limitation and transcendence: the human mind, striving toward truth, confronts the boundaries of its own representational power and thereby recognizes its dependence on the divine source of truth. The present article undertakes a detailed critical evaluation of Wee’s work. It analyzes the logical coherence of her dynamic model, its textual foundations in the Meditations, and its relation to both Cartesian and Scholastic traditions. By combining conceptual analysis with comparative study, the paper aims to assess whether the dynamic interpretation truly clarifies or instead complicates the understanding of material falsity in Descartes. The findings indicate that although Wee’s approach is historically and hermeneutically persuasive, it requires further philosophical precision to avoid conflating epistemological and theological levels of analysis. In conclusion, Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’ Meditations represents a significant contribution to the field of Cartesian scholarship. It reopens a neglected question and encourages renewed reflection on the interplay between truth, representation, and human error. Even if not entirely free from conceptual tension, Wee’s interpretation serves as an inspiring framework for rethinking the dynamics of cognition and the moral dimension of error within rationalist philosophy. From this perspective, material falsity is no longer a marginal notion but a key to understanding Descartes’s vision of the mind as both finite and self-transcending—a being whose very errors disclose its orientation toward truth.

Abstract In an era where competition between businesses to achieve much narrower goals and establishing a two-way relationship with customers is much more difficult, understanding the position of public relations in organizations has a significant impact on their success and failure rates. The history of public relations is a vast repository of models and methods that attempt to help businesses achieve this. At the forefront of this field is Edward Bernays, who is often referred to as the father of public relations. His approaches in the 1920s not only changed the way companies interacted with their audiences, but also changed social norms. This article examines and evaluates Bernays's "Engineering of Consent" theory and tries to contribute to a better understanding of this theory with the help of integrated critique method including content, methodological and historical critiques. The results show that the urgent need of companies to sell their mass-produced products after the First World War forced Bernays to go for new methods in the field of audience persuasion. Using the principles of psychology, he was able to create a new approach in advertising and public relations; Although some find his methods deceptive. In today’s hyper-competitive and media-saturated business environment, the role of public relations (PR) has become pivotal in shaping public perception and driving strategic organizational outcomes. Among the seminal contributors to this field is Edward L. Bernays, a figure widely regarded as the father of modern public relations. His concept of the "The Engineering of Consent" —originally introduced in the early 20th century—continues to influence communication strategies in marketing, politics, and social movements. This paper offers a comprehensive critique of Bernays’ theory through a tripartite lens: content analysis, methodological review, and historical context. The study begins with a detailed account of Bernays’ biography, including his familial connections to Sigmund Freud and his formative experiences during World War I. Bernays’ professional journey reveals a transition from journalism to pioneering PR campaigns, where he applied psychological principles to manipulate public behavior subtly. Notably, his “Torches of Freedom” campaign reframed cigarette smoking as a symbol of women's liberation, exemplifying how media events could redefine societal norms. Bernays’ theory, most clearly articulated in his 1947 article "The Engineering of Consent" posits that consent among the public can and should be shaped using systematic, scientific approaches akin to engineering disciplines. He proposed an eight-step model for this process, which includes setting objectives, identifying target audiences, modifying goals based on resources, choosing strategies, selecting themes and symbols, organizing logistical resources, implementing structured timelines, and executing planned actions. From a content perspective, the theory emphasizes the power of mass media and elite influence in shaping public opinion. It integrates Freudian psychology to target unconscious desires, thereby creating artificial needs and reshaping consumer behavior. The strengths of the theory lie in its strategic planning framework, applicability across sectors, and its recognition of the psychological dimensions of public influence. It highlights how organizations can proactively shape their image and narrative by understanding and manipulating human motivation. However, the theory is not without critical weaknesses. Ethically, the theory faces severe criticisms for advocating manipulative and potentially deceptive practices. It presumes a passive, uninformed public susceptible to control, a perspective that many scholars argue undermines democratic engagement and critical thinking. Critics assert that Bernays’ methods reduce the public to mere instruments for elite agendas, rather than active participants in the public discourse. Furthermore, the theory overlooks cultural variability and assumes universal applicability, which is problematic in today’s globalized and diverse media landscape. From a methodological standpoint, the theory lacks empirical rigor. Bernays relied largely on anecdotal evidence and personal experience, with no clear use of scientific data collection, analysis, or validation processes. This lack of methodological transparency challenges the theory’s generalizability and academic robustness. While the model’s effectiveness has been retrospectively supported by its success in various PR campaigns, the absence of replicable procedures or measurable outcomes reduces its scientific credibility. Thus, the theory, although operationally impactful, remains philosophically and empirically underdeveloped. The historical analysis situates the theory within the sociopolitical context of early 20th-century America, marked by industrialization, mass production, and the rise of consumer capitalism. Bernays’ ideas emerged in response to the need for managing public opinion during wartime propaganda and peacetime consumption. His approach directly aligned with the interests of corporations and governments seeking to mold public sentiment and behavior for economic or political gains. The model, therefore, can be seen as a byproduct of an era where manipulation of public perception was not only acceptable but encouraged in pursuit of national and commercial objectives. In the context of organizational theory, Bernays’ model shares features with classical theories that emphasize rational planning, predictability, and control. However, the theory’s behavioral underpinnings, influenced by psychoanalysis and mass psychology, also link it to early behaviorist models. The theory fails to anticipate later developments in PR, especially the emergence of dialogic models that prioritize transparency, mutual respect, and audience agency—elements vital in the age of social media and digital communication. Additionally, the normative critique of the theory is significant. In contemporary PR practice, ethical considerations are paramount. The theory’s foundational reliance on subconscious influence and symbolic manipulation invites ethical dilemmas, particularly around informed consent, authenticity, and manipulation. In this regard, Bernays’ model appears outdated and incompatible with modern democratic values and communication ethics. The study also incorporates secondary critiques using frameworks from scholars such as Bacharach, Whetten, Klimoski, and Thomas & Tymon, evaluating the theory on criteria like logical consistency, empirical utility, conceptual clarity, and operational applicability. While Bernays’ model adds strategic value to public relations theory and provides a systematic view of influence, its theoretical shortcomings and ethical limitations call for cautious application and contextual adaptation. In conclusion, the paper acknowledges that Edward Bernays’ "The Engineering of Consent" remains a landmark theory in the evolution of public relations, offering a structured approach to influence. However, the theory’s shortcomings—especially its lack of methodological rigor and ethical ambiguity—highlight the need for updated models that align with modern values of transparency, inclusivity, and participatory communication. As media and society continue to evolve, future research should seek to reinterpret Bernays’ legacy in light of current challenges, such as digital misinformation, ethical marketing, and responsible persuasion.