Pizhuhish nāmah-i intiqādī-i mutūn va barnāmah hā-yi ̒ulūm-i insāni (Critical Studies in Texts & Programs of Human Sciences)

Abstract One of the most significant ideological and yet technical debates of the early twentieth century is the socialist calculation debate, which took place between Mises and Hayek as proponents of capitalism and socialists such as Lange. Our objective in this article is to examine the rise and fall of this debate by analyzing Hayek's most important work in this field, the book "Individualism and Economic Order". This discussion began with Mises, who claimed that a socialist economy and, consequently, economic planning were impossible. He reasoned that this impossibility stemmed from the inability of a planning system to calculate prices. This impossibility was interpreted by socialists like Lange as the impossibility of socialism due to the complexity of calculations or the absence of competition in a socialist system. However, Mises and later Austrian economists like Hayek argued that this impossibility was something beyond mere computational problems related to price calculation or the lack of competition. Although Hayek makes crucial points in explaining the miracle of the price mechanism and the market institution, he has overlooked important issues, and his theory has become an idealized one. While it is true that socialism is impossible due to the elimination of the market, the abstract capitalism envisioned by Hayek is also practically impossible for non-Western countries due to its abstract and ahistorical perspective. Introduction The debate over the "Socialist Calculation Debate" is one of the most fundamental disputes in the history of twenty century economic thought. Hayek dedicated three separate articles to this subject in his book “Individualism and Economic Order”. The context of this controversy dates back to 1920, when Mises argued that a socialist economy, due to the absence of a price system for capital goods, is incapable of rational economic calculation. In response, Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner put forward the theory of "market socialism," claiming that a planning board could determine equilibrium prices through trial and error and by simulating the market mechanism. In these three articles, while expanding and completing Mises's critique, Hayek provides a decisive and profound response to these claims — a response that goes beyond mere "impracticality" of planning and points to its epistemological impossibility Materials and Methods One of the most important methodological points made by Hayek is his rejection of the common narrative of the debate, which claims Mises had in mind theoretical and absolute "impossibility" while Hayek considered practical "impossibility." Hayek emphasizes that there is no separation between the theoretical and the practical: a theory that relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as perfect knowledge and a static world, is an invalid theory. From Hayek's perspective, the mathematical economics approach, with its simultaneous equations, systematically eliminates what is our main task to explain. In this collection of articles, Hayek presents his epistemological argument, which is the core of his critique of socialism. In his view, if we assume that all the knowledge necessary for planning is available to a single mind, then no economic problem exists, and the problem becomes merely technical. However, in the real world, knowledge is dispersed among millions of individuals, and a significant part of this knowledge is knowledge of particular time and place (local and tacit knowledge) that cannot be collected or centralized. A planning board can never gain access to this knowledge, regardless of its computational power. In response to Hayek, Lange proposed "managed competition," whereby a planning board could achieve equilibrium prices by experimentally setting prices, checking warehouse inventories, and adjusting prices based on surplus or shortage. Hayek argues that Lange and his supporters "contemplate a stationary world in which no further change occurs and economic history has reached its final stage." They ignore the central role of the capital market, speculators, and entrepreneurs. Hayek also offers a fundamental critique of the concept of "marginal cost" which Lange uses as a pricing criterion. He writes that "the excessive preoccupation with the hypothetical conditions of a stationary equilibrium has led modern economics... to endow the concept of costs with a definiteness and certainty which cannot be attributed to any cost phenomenon in real life." In the real world, where constant change exists, costs are not "given"; rather, they are shaped by entrepreneurs' subjective estimates of future selling prices. Discussion and Result In these articles, considering Lange and his supporters as his opponents, Hayek concludes that rational economic calculation under socialism is not only impractical but impossible. His main argument can be summarized in several points: The first point concerns the unrealistic nature of the "market simulation game." In a real market, investors and speculators risk their own wealth and destiny, and this is what makes them accountable to consumers. In his view, "speculating and investing cannot be played at." The second point concerns the lack of a real capital market. Lange denies the existence of a market for capital goods, but Hayek shows that without a capital market, there is no signal for intertemporal allocation of resources. The main function of the capital market is to assess which investments have been successful and which have been unsuccessful. In the absence of real prices for capital goods, the planning board "cannot know whether a particular investment is rational or not." The third point concerns the concept of competition as a discovery process. For Hayek, competition is a discovery process, not a state of equilibrium. The cost and demand curves which Lange assumes the planning board has access to do not "exist objectively in the real world and are therefore not recognizable to real actors; they must be discovered day by day." This discovery process only occurs when entrepreneurs risk their own resources and face real competition. Conclusion In the "Socialist Calculation" articles of Individualism and Economic Order, Hayek elevates Mises's critique of socialism from a "computational" argument to a deeper "epistemological" one. He shows that the main problem of socialism is not a lack of computational power, but our structural ignorance of the inherent dispersion of knowledge in society. No planning board, regardless of its computational ability, can obtain the dispersed knowledge that resides in the minds of millions of individuals and is transmitted through price signals in the market. Hayek's theoretical innovation in this debate is shifting the focus of attention from equilibrium to process. While Lange and neoclassical economics were focused on finding equilibrium prices (a problem that is unsolvable even in theory), Hayek showed that the real problem is "coordination" under conditions of constant change. The capital market and entrepreneurship are the institutions that make this coordination possible, and their elimination means eliminating the possibility of any rational calculation. Ultimately, this controversy remains not only as a powerful theoretical critique of socialism but also as a fundamental statement about the nature of knowledge, rationality, and social order.

Abstract Rise of Akhbārī school of jurisprudence in Eleventh/Seventeenth century under Safavids led Imami religious establishment into a determining process. Akhbārī invitation caused dramatic changes to the extent that contemporary Safavid Scholars were made to pay special attention to this case. Taking a sociological approach, Mansur Sifatgol is a prominent historiographer who has made a significant effort to study Imami religious establishment under Safavids. In his book “The Structure of Religious Thought and Institution in Safavid Persia”, he has put a special stress on religious institutional changes during Eleventh/Seventeenth century and in doing so, he makes a comparison between political and religious structural changes which is a considerable achievement in historical studies. However, his analysis has been established based on a particular notion of Akhbārī theory which is to a great extent influenced by anti-rational reading of Akhbārīsm. Confessing to the importance and significance of the accomplishments of the book, this paper, from a critical perspective, concentrates on how Sifatgol perceives Akhbārī jurisprudential approach. Introduction This study presents a critical evaluation of Mansur Sifatgol’s “The Structure of Religious Thought and Institution in Safavid Persia”, a seminal work distinguished by its application of a Weberian sociological framework to the religious transformations of Safavid Iran. While acknowledging the book’s methodological significance and its focused attention on religious relations as drivers of historical change, this paper identifies a fundamental flaw in its foundational premise. The central argument posits that Sifatgol’s entire analysis of the Akhbārī-Uṣūlī dispute is heavily influenced by an “anti-rational reading” of the Akhbārī school. Consequently, his characterisation of Akhbārīsm through concepts like “intellectual stagnation,” a “return to Salafi thought,” and “traditionism” is a distortion. This paper seeks to challenge this narrative by proposing an alternative, “immanent” understanding of the Akhbārī movement, not as intellectual rigidity, but as a profound methodological transformation aimed at restoring certainty in legal derivation. Materials & Methods The research employs a critical-comparative methodology to analyse the work of Mansur Sifatgol. The primary material is Sifatgol’s book itself, with its key arguments and analytical frameworks being systematically deconstructed. The critique is structured around five central axes of Sifatgol’s project: (1) the correspondence between political decline and Akhbārī intellectual stagnation, (2) the equation of Akhbārīsm with a Salafi return to traditionism, (3) the portrayal of Akhbārīsm as a socio-political reaction against the state, and (4) its presumed inherent conflict with philosophy and mysticism. The method involves contrasting Sifatgol’s interpretations with a direct re-reading of primary Akhbārī texts, such as those by Muḥammad Amīn Astarābādī, and the conceptual framework provided by contemporary scholars like al-Samāhījī’s category of the “mujtahid-muḥaddith.” This internal textual evidence is used to test the validity of Sifatgol’s external sociological attributions against the school’s own epistemological logic. Discussion & Results The analysis reveals significant discrepancies between Sifatgol’s narrative and the internal dynamics of the Akhbārī school. The discussion of results is organised into four key findings: 1. On Intellectual Stagnation: Sifatgol’s correlation of Akhbārī dominance with the Safavid state’s “period of consolidation and decline” is identified as an ex post facto explanation. The study finds that Akhbārīs, characterized as “mujtahid-muḥaddiths,” were products of rational education who critically attacked the principle of “consensus” (ijmāʿ) precisely to create more freedom in jurisprudence, thus displaying the very “ijtihādī dynamism” Sifatgol denies them. 2. On Salafism and Traditionism: The finding challenges the notion of a “return.” Astarābādī’s call for scriptural primacy is reinterpreted not as a regressive imitation of early scholars but as a new methodological demand for a certainty-oriented approach against the conjecture-based ijtihād of the Ḥilla school. 3. On Political Reaction: The analysis finds that Sifatgol’s model overlooks the diversity amongst jurists. Astarābādī’s critique was directed at a specific theory of ijtihād, not the institution of ijtihād or clerical authority itself, negating the idea of a fundamental political revolt. 4. On Conflict with Philosophy: Sifatgol’s claim of Astarābādī’s anti-philosophical stance is refuted through textual evidence. It is shown that Sifatgol misidentifies the targets of Astarābādī’s critiques and overlooks Astarābādī’s own deep concern for a rigorous education in the rational sciences, thus invalidating the myth of Akhbārī irrationalism. Conclusion The paper concludes that the failure of Sifatgol’s influential project lies not in its attempt to link jurisprudential theories with social conditions, but in its uncritical adoption of a late, stereotypical, and anti-rationalist reading of Akhbārīsm. By imposing a political model of “decline” onto a complex theological movement, Sifatgol’s analysis fundamentally misrepresents the internal epistemological vitality of the Akhbārī school. This case study demonstrates a critical pitfall in historical sociology: the imposition of external social categories can distort the object of study if its immanent intellectual logic is not first thoroughly understood. The study underscores the necessity for a fundamental revision in the historiography of the Akhbārī-Uṣūlī dispute.

Abstract This article provides a critical assessment of contemporary Iranian scholarship on Saadi’s political thought, focusing on four influential works by Homa Katouzian, Abbas Milani and Maryam Mirzadeh, Rouhollah Eslami, and Seyyed Javad Tabatabaei. The central question concerns how Saʿdī is represented in these readings as a political thinker and how his relationship to politics is interpreted. Drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics, and emphasizing the dialectical relation between explanation and understanding, the article demonstrates that although Saʿdī lacks a coherent and systematic political theory, his works embody a form of practical, people-centered, and realist political rationality. The findings indicate that politics in Saʿdī’s thought is grounded less in abstract theorization than in lived experience, critical ethics, context-sensitive advisory writing, and resistance to injustice. These features render Saʿdī a significant resource for the rethinking of indigenous political reflection in Iran. Extended Abstract This article offers a critical and interpretive examination of contemporary Iranian scholarship on the political thought of Saadi of Shiraz, one of the most influential figures in classical Persian literature. While Saadi is traditionally celebrated as a moralist, poet, and educator, his political ideas have increasingly attracted scholarly attention in recent decades, particularly within debates on indigenous political thought, ethics of power, and the relationship between morality and governance in Iranian intellectual history. The central argument of this article is that Saadi does indeed possess a coherent form of political rationality, albeit not in the form of a systematic political theory. Rather, his political thought is articulated through practical wisdom, ethical admonition, narrative strategies, and experiential realism. By analyzing major contemporary interpretations of Saadi, this study seeks to clarify the methodological assumptions behind these readings and to evaluate their explanatory power and limitations. Introduction The question of whether classical Persian literary figures can be considered political thinkers has long been a matter of debate in Iranian intellectual history. In recent years, this debate has intensified with regard to Saadi, whose works—particularly Bustan and Golestan—contain numerous reflections on power, justice, tyranny, governance, and social order. Contemporary scholars have attempted to situate Saadi within broader discussions of political ethics, statecraft, and social criticism. However, these attempts have often produced divergent and sometimes conflicting interpretations. Some scholars view Saadi as a pragmatic moralist operating within an authoritarian political culture, while others emphasize his humanism, proto-liberal tendencies, or critical stance toward power. This article argues that such divergences stem less from ambiguities in Saadi’s texts than from differences in interpretive frameworks and methodological presuppositions adopted by scholars. Accordingly, the article aims to critically assess selected influential Iranian studies on Saadi’s political thought, focusing on the works of Homa Katouzian, Abbas Milani and Maryam Mirzadeh, Ruhollah Eslami, and Javad Tabatabaei. By applying Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics, the article seeks to move beyond reductive readings and to propose a more balanced understanding of Saadi’s political rationality. Materials & Methods The methodological framework of this study is grounded in Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical theory, particularly his tripartite model of interpretation: explanation, understanding, and appropriation. This approach allows the text to be analyzed independently of authorial intention while preserving its historical specificity and opening it to contemporary meaning. In the explanatory phase, the article examines the structural, linguistic, and narrative features of Saadi’s texts as they are employed by modern interpreters. In the interpretive phase, these features are situated within broader intellectual, social, and political contexts, including traditions of advice literature (andarznāmeh) and Islamic ethical thought. Finally, in the phase of appropriation, the study evaluates how Saadi’s political insights can be meaningfully related to contemporary debates on power, ethics, and governance. The materials analyzed consist of key contemporary Iranian monographs and articles on Saadi’s political thought. These works are treated not merely as secondary commentaries but as interpretive acts shaped by distinct theoretical commitments—such as historical sociology, humanism, structuralism, and intellectual history. The study does not seek to rank these interpretations hierarchically but rather to assess their internal coherence, methodological rigor, and capacity to illuminate Saadi’s political vision. Discussion & Results The analysis reveals that contemporary interpretations of Saadi can be grouped into four major approaches. Katouzian situates Saadi within the framework of Iranian authoritarianism, emphasizing the absence of stable political institutions and the predominance of moral counsel over legal or constitutional constraints. From this perspective, Saadi emerges as a pragmatic adviser who seeks to humanize power rather than transform political structures. While this reading highlights important historical constraints, it risks reducing Saadi’s political thought to a mere reflection of despotism. Milani and Mirzadeh adopt a humanistic reading, portraying Saadi as a thinker who prioritizes individual dignity, rationality, and ethical autonomy. They argue that Saʿdi anticipates elements of modern humanism by emphasizing compassion, moderation, and the moral responsibility of rulers toward subjects. Although this approach successfully foregrounds Saadi’s ethical universalism, it occasionally projects modern categories onto a premodern context, thereby underestimating the embeddedness of his thought in traditional moral frameworks. Eslami’s structural analysis interprets Saadi’s political thought through the lens of everyday life, identifying recurring patterns related to power, livelihood, pleasure, and religion. This reading underscores Saadi’s realism and attentiveness to lived social relations. However, its emphasis on structural regularities may obscure the narrative and rhetorical dimensions through which Saadi conveys political meaning. Tabatabaei’s intellectual-historical approach highlights Saadi’s innovation within the tradition of advice literature, particularly his departure from abstract moralism toward experiential and situational judgment. This interpretation compellingly situates Saadi within the trajectory of Iranian political decline, yet it tends to subordinate ethical analysis to historical diagnosis. Taken together, these findings suggest that Saadi’s political thought is best understood as a form of practical political rationality that resists systematic codification. His engagement with politics operates through narrative exemplification, ethical critique, and attention to concrete human situations rather than through abstract theory. Conclusion This study concludes that Saadi should neither be dismissed as a non-political moralist nor elevated to the status of a modern political theorist. His political thought occupies an intermediate space characterized by ethical realism, narrative reasoning, and critical engagement with power. By applying Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, the article demonstrates that Saadi’s texts retain a surplus of meaning that allows for multiple yet bounded interpretations. A balanced reading must therefore preserve historical distance while enabling contemporary appropriation. Ultimately, Saadi’s political relevance lies in his capacity to articulate a morally grounded critique of power that remains sensitive to human vulnerability and social complexity. Such a perspective can enrich ongoing discussions of indigenous political thought in Iran and offer alternative ways of conceptualizing the relationship between ethics and politics beyond rigid theoretical systems.

Abstract The most important protections from the perspective of constitutional principles that can be expressed in the area of ​​economic security relate to economic development, investment, and related principles. It is of great importance to examine these principles, threats, and supports that can affect the country's economic development. This study will critically examine the economic principles of the Constitution from the perspective of supporting economic security. The purpose of this article, which is an applied and descriptive-analytical research, is to reach the following conclusion: What is the role of the economic principles of the Constitution from the perspective of supporting economic security and what are its effects? In this regard, it is assumed that principles such as Articles 3, 22, 43, and 47 of the Constitution can be considered to support economic security, and principles such as Articles 44, 81, and 139 of the Constitution can be considered to threaten economic security. In this regard, identifying and diagnosing the principles that support and threaten economic security is of great importance in order to support the economic security of the individual and society. Introduction Security is a fundamental concept in human social life. This concept strengthens the feeling of peace, stability, and confidence in the future among the people of society. In order to continue their social life, humans need to be safe from various dangers and threats. The lack of security creates social unrest, reduces public trust, and disrupts social order. Security is not limited to the absence of military threats and encompasses various dimensions. These dimensions include military, economic, political, social, cultural, and environmental areas that are formed in interaction with each other. Economic security is the most important indicator of development. Political crises, civil wars, and the inattention of those in power to the interests of society are factors that increase the fragility of the security of capital and human resources every minute. Basically, the economic system in any country is implemented only in the shadow of economic security. Improving the efficiency of production and use of resources, achieving economic prosperity, or reducing the shortage of goods and services is the ultimate goal of any developed economic system. On the one hand, economic security is the intermediate goal of the economic system in most economic schools, and its ultimate goal is welfare for civil society, in which economic progress flows and reaches its destination. Materials & Methods The aim of the present article, which is an applied research and in terms of data collection and information and analysis method, is an analytical and descriptive article, is to reach the conclusion that what is the role of the economic principles of the Constitution from the perspective of supporting economic security and what are their effects? In this regard, it is assumed that principles such as Articles 3, 22, 43 and 47 of the Constitution can be considered to support economic security and principles such as Articles 44, 81 and 139 of the Constitution can be considered to threaten economic security. In this regard, identifying and diagnosing the principles that support and threaten economic security in order to support the economic security of the individual and society is of great importance. Discussion & Result Based on Article 22 of the Constitution, the dignity, life, property, rights, housing, and occupation of individuals are considered immune from attack, except in cases prescribed by law. This principle is one of the fundamental pillars of economic security and citizenship rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to this principle, the economic security of citizens is considered part of their inherent rights, and the government is obligated to guarantee this security through legislative, executive, and judicial measures. Attacking the property, occupation, or housing of individuals without a legal basis is considered a violation of this principle and contrary to the legal order of the country. Consequently, any action taken by the government or executive institutions against these immunities and causing damage to individuals creates the responsibility for compensation for the government. This principle, along with other principles, such as Article 43 and Article 3, Clause 12 of the Constitution, provides a coherent and orderly structure for ensuring the economic and property security of the people; therefore, the government is obliged not to violate the framework of these principles in all its policies and actions and, in the event of a violation, to accept civil and political responsibility for it. We will continue to examine the principles supporting economic security in the Constitution. The Constitution and the ambiguities that exist in this important law of the country and, simply, the most important law of the country can create many problems in the field of foreign investment. Meanwhile, the role of the Constitution as the highest legal document of a system is undeniable. This law, as the most important law of a state, expresses the attitude of that state towards important issues of society; therefore, the understanding of the Constitution of foreign investment is very important. Unfortunately, in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, principles such as Articles 44, 81, and 139, which are the economic principles of the Constitution, are formulated in a way that indicates inferences and perceptions that prevent the attraction of foreign investment and ultimately weaken economic security. These principles can be considered important legal obstacles to supporting economic security in the government, which seems necessary to review, amend, and at least provide a clear and definitive interpretation by the authorities in order to clarify the law and remove ambiguity. Conclusion Several principles of the Constitution, such as principles 22, 43, 44, and 47, which protect legitimate ownership, economic justice, economic independence, and public participation in the economy, support economic security as fundamental legal rules. Principle 22 protects the dignity, life, property, rights, housing, and employment of individuals, principle 43 ensures basic needs and economic independence, principle 44 defines the economic system into three sectors: government, cooperative, and private, and encourages public participation in the economy, and principle 47 protects legitimate ownership. All of these have provided the necessary grounds for the realization of a stable legal economic order. These principles, in terms of their binding nature and their superior position in the hierarchy of laws, should be considered as a strategic charter for economic legislation. In addition, the general policies of Article 44 of the Constitution, which were issued by the Supreme Leader's decree to strengthen the private sector and reduce the government's entrepreneurial role, can be considered as the main pillars of strengthening economic security if supported by complementary executive laws. In addition, Articles 81 and 139 of the Constitution, along with Article 44, have been drafted in a way that has created obstacles to the entry of foreign investment. By prohibiting the establishment of foreign companies except in exceptional and ambiguous cases, Article 81 has made it difficult for foreign investors to enter through the legal route. By making the referral of claims related to public and state property conditional on arbitration, Article 139 has effectively transformed the process of resolving economic disputes into a bureaucratic and complicated process that is contrary to the logic of competitive economics. Such regulations, by increasing transaction costs, reducing the expected return, and creating legal uncertainty, darken the investment climate for international actors. Therefore, a review or corrective interpretation of these principles, with the aim of strengthening the rule of law, supporting competition, legal transparency, and reducing the regulatory role of the state, will also be a fundamental prerequisite for economic security in Iran’s legal context.

Abstract The issue of recognizing external objects in modern philosophy, especially with the denial of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, has become a fundamental problem. In this context, Kant, in his transcendental idealism, sought to explain external objects based on the necessary unity of consciousness; for him, the object is the product of the self-consciousness's determination of sensory data. Concepts and categories of understanding serve as expressions of this unity of self-consciousness, acting as a formal judgment that is applied to the diverse material of the senses and provides representational objects in experience. However, Hegel, in his "Phenomenology of Spirit" offered a different explanation of how objectivity is constituted, not based on reliance on sensory data. He initially critiqued Kant's transcendental self-consciousness, explaining that the relationship between self-consciousness and the world is not immediate but is mediated through "Desire" and ultimately through the "Other." This article aims to examine how "Desire" signifies self-consciousness and then, through it, the essential role of the "Other" in the formation of self-consciousness. Finally, by providing an analysis of the dialectic of master and slave, it will demonstrate how the concept of "Work" in the slave plays a key role in the constitution of objectivity in Hegelian idealism through the subject's objectification of its content and its recognition by the "Other." Introduction The problem of objectivity and the possibility of cognition of external objects constitutes one of the most fundamental challenges of modern philosophy. This problem became particularly acute after the collapse of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and the consequent weakening of the possibility of a direct correspondence between consciousness and the external world. Within this context, Kant’s transcendental idealism sought to preserve the necessity and universality of objective knowledge by grounding objectivity in the a priori unity of self-consciousness. By denying any immediate access to the thing in itself, Kant understood objectivity as the result of the transcendental self-consciousness’s determination of the manifold of sensible intuition, and he conceived the categories of the understanding as the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience. Nevertheless, Kant’s account of objectivity, insofar as it relies on a merely formal and contentless unity, became the target of sustained criticism, most notably by Hegel. The present article undertakes a critical reconstruction of Hegel’s alternative account of objectivity as developed in the “Phenomenology of Spirit”, and argues that Hegel fundamentally transforms the concept of objectivity from a purely epistemological and formal notion into one that is historical, intersubjective, and practical. The central question guiding the analysis is how objectivity becomes possible in Hegel’s system and what role the concepts of “Desire,” “The Other,” and, above all, “Work” play in its constitution. Materials & Methods Methodologically, the article adopts an analytical and interpretive approach, grounded in a close conceptual reading of the sections on consciousness and self-consciousness in the “Phenomenology of Spirit”. It begins by reconstructing the Kantian framework of objectivity, with particular emphasis on the transcendental deduction and the function of the unity of apperception, in order to clarify the background against which Hegel’s critique is formulated. Discussion & Result Hegel, while accepting that unity is a necessary condition of experience, rejects the Kantian view that such unity is an a priori, purely formal, and presupposed structure. Instead, he conceives unity as the result of a dialectical process that is mediated and achieved. A central thesis of the article is that, for Hegel, the relation between self-consciousness and the world is never immediate. Rather, it is mediated through desire and, ultimately, through the relation to another self-consciousness. Self-consciousness initially appears as desire, striving to attain certainty of itself by negating otherness and reducing the world to an object of its own satisfaction. This attempt, however, necessarily fails, since the negation of “The Other” simultaneously reveals self-consciousness’s dependence on that very “Other”. Consequently, self-consciousness can achieve fulfillment only in relation to another self-consciousness and through a process of recognition. This dynamic is articulated most clearly in the dialectic of master and slave. The article demonstrates that although the master initially appears as an independent self-consciousness and the slave as a dependent one, this asymmetry is fundamentally reversed through the experiences of fear and work. Fear of death turns the slave’s consciousness inward and deepens its self-relation, while work—understood as disciplined, purposive, and delayed activity—enables the objectification of the slave’s inner capacities and intentions. The article’s key finding is that it is in the slave’s work that a distinctively Hegelian meaning of objectivity first emerges. Work is not merely the transformation of natural objects; rather, it is a process through which self-consciousness externalizes and embodies its inner content—its aims, values, and ideas—in the external world. The product of work is thus an object that is both objectively real and a manifestation of the subject’s self-consciousness. In this way, objectivity is no longer conceived merely as the subsumption of sensible data under a priori concepts, but as the objective embodiment of self-consciousness in a shared world that is available for recognition by others. The article further argues that this point marks the fundamental difference between Kantian and Hegelian objectivity. Whereas Kantian objectivity rests on a formal unity of self-consciousness and remains largely confined to the domain of nature, Hegelian objectivity arises from practical, historical, and intersubjective processes and extends into the realm of spirit, culture, and human life. From this perspective, work is not simply an economic or physical activity, but a central epistemological and ontological category through which objectivity is constituted within idealism. Conclusion In conclusion, the article maintains that by rejecting the Kantian notion of the thing in itself and any external anchor for reality, Hegel is compelled to ground objectivity entirely within self-consciousness. However, this grounding cannot be achieved by an isolated or purely theoretical self-consciousness. Objectivity becomes possible only through practical objectification and through recognition by the “Other”. The slave’s work thus provides a paradigmatic model for understanding how objectivity is realized in human life: as the outcome of action, historical development, and mutual recognition. This reconceptualization of objectivity opens the way for a conception of objective human sciences beyond the Kantian framework and underscores Hegel’s pivotal role in redefining the relation between subject and object

Abstract This critical review employs a combined approach of internal critique (analysis of theoretical-methodological coherence) and external critique (comparative assessment against global literature) to examine Lee and Blevins’ (2025) "Social Media and Digital Politics". The findings indicate that the book’s innovative integration of Social Network Analysis and Critical Theory offers a profound understanding of the role of digital emotions and mechanisms such as echo chambers in transforming political discourse. However, key critical outcomes reveal three major limitations: a narrow geographical focus on Western cases, which reduces the generalizability of the findings; a negative bias toward social media, overlooking its positive functions in political mobilization; and a lack of concrete policy recommendations. Consequently, by situating the work within broader international scholarship, this review proposes greater attention to non-Western contexts, a more balanced analysis of social media’s impacts, and the development of actionable guidelines as essential directions for future research and practice. Introduction This critical review focuses on Lee and Blevins' (2025) "Social Media and Digital Politics" due to its innovative and timely synthesis of quantitative Social Network Analysis (SNA) and qualitative Critical Theory a methodological integration not yet fully explored in other major works on digital politics. The pervasive influence of social media on political and social discourse is undeniable. Initially hailed as potential democratizing agents, these platforms are now critically scrutinized for fostering polarization, emotional reasoning, and filter bubbles. This book emerges as a pivotal text aiming to bridge the gap between network studies and critical discourse analysis. The review provides a multidimensional assessment, evaluating the book’s theoretical and methodological framework, identifying its innovations and strengths, and critically examining its limitations particularly its geographical focus and neglect of social media's positive potentials. The analysis situates the book within the wider scholarly conversation to outline its contribution and areas for future development. Materials and Method The analytical approach of this review mirrors the book's own integrative spirit. It employs an internal critique, assessing the coherence of the book's argument and its use of SNA and Critical Theory. Simultaneously, it conducts an external critique by comparing the book's findings with contemporary international research, including studies from the Global South (e.g., Clark & Grecea, 2023). The review systematically analyzes the book's core chapters, which utilize extensive empirical data from various social media platforms to investigate shifts in political discourse structures, the network dynamics of information flow, and the ascendancy of emotion over rational argumentation. This method allows for a balanced evaluation of both the book's groundbreaking insights and its conceptual or contextual oversights. Discussion and Result The discussion is structured around the book's main arguments and the critiques they invite. The book's primary strength lies in its successful fusion of SNA—mapping key nodes and closed networks that reinforce biases—and Critical Theory, which unveils underlying power structures and inequalities. This combination provides a nuanced understanding of how social media platforms can undermine democratic deliberation by prioritizing emotional engagement. A key finding of the book is the central role of affect and emotion in driving political discourse online, often at the expense of rational-critical debate, leading to increased polarization. This review confirms several strengths: Innovative Multi-Dimensional Approach: The integration of network analysis (quantitative) and critical theory (qualitative) frameworks, employed throughout the work. Innovation in Analyzing Political Affect: A specific focus on "digital emotion" as a key driving force in politics, supported by numerous case study analyses. Strong Empirical Documentation with Vast Data: The use of large, multi-platform datasets, which are detailed extensively. Successful Link Between Theory and Practice: Establishing a direct connection between empirical findings and critical theoretical frameworks, prominently demonstrated in the concluding sections. Critical Limitations: The analysis also reveals significant shortcomings. These critiques are strengthened by specific references to the book's content: Negativity Bias: The book predominantly highlights the negative consequences of social media. While its analysis of mechanisms like "echo chambers" and "affective polarization" is deep, the documented positive roles of these platforms in political mobilization and social movements are either absent or relegated to brief mentions, lacking equivalent empirical depth. Geographical and Cultural Myopia: The analysis is heavily skewed towards Western case studies, which limits the generalizability of its findings. This is evident in the methodological foundation and the selection of data sources and case studies, leading to a neglect of the diverse functionalities and political ecologies of platforms dominant outside the Western world. Lack of Practical Solutions: While providing deep diagnostic analysis of challenges, the book offers few concrete policy recommendations or practical strategies. The concluding sections synthesize findings but fail to translate them into a dedicated, actionable framework, leaving a gap between critique and constructive resolution. The review notes a relative neglect of two key areas: 1. The precise mechanics of algorithmic influence: While algorithms are frequently cited as actors, the book does not delve into the specific engineering choices (e.g., ranking signals, recommender system architectures) that drive the observed outcomes. 2. The complex interplay between traditional and digital media ecosystems: The analysis treats social media as a largely isolated sphere, missing opportunities to examine how agendas and frames cycle between broadcast news, print journalism, and digital platforms. Conclusion " Social Media and Digital Politics" stands as a seminal work for its innovative fusion of network analysis and critical theory, offering a profound diagnosis of emotional drivers in digital politics. However, its analytical value is constrained by a pessimistic Western-centric lens and a lack of actionable solutions. Thus, the book's primary legacy is to serve as a crucial foundation for future research that must expand its geographical scope, demystify algorithmic governance, and translate critical insights into concrete policy frameworks for a healthier digital public sphere Policy Recommendations: Establish Algorithmic Governance Frameworks: Governments and regulatory bodies should mandate transparency and accountability for platform algorithms, including requirements for independent audits and public disclosure of societal impacts for core algorithms Invest in Critical Digital Literacy: Educational policymakers should design and implement mandatory curricula from school through university to strengthen critical thinking skills, source evaluation, and understanding of digital media mechanisms. Support Non-Profit and Public Alternatives: Creating and strengthening digital public media platforms with independent funding models can foster spaces for quality discourse less driven by commercial emotional triggers Future research should employ comparative cross-cultural methodologies to empirically test the efficacy of different platform governance and algorithm design models in diverse political contexts to provide context-aware and effective solutions.