Anthony J. Steinbock’s book, Phenomenology and Mysticism, represents a novel step in the phenomenology of religious experience by introducing the concept of “verticality” as a fundamental mode of givenness beyond subject-centric and objectifying patterns. Through a phenomenological analysis of mystical reports from three Abrahamic traditions—Teresa of Avila, Dov Baer, and Ruzbehan Baqli—the work seeks to describe the structure of the “manifestation” of the sacred and to offer a cultural-social critique of “idolatry” as the inversion of this verticality. The present article, while acknowledging the significant contributions of this work in opening a new horizon for the philosophy of religion, employs an analytical-critical method to explore two of its fundamental challenges. First, the methodological tension between the claim to describe lived experience and the practical reliance on the interpretation of historical texts, which raises the question of the possibility of a “phenomenology without direct experience.” Second, conceptual ambiguities in explaining the relationship of “verticality” to the general structure of consciousness, coupled with the deliberate limitation of its claims to Abrahamic traditions, which appears incompatible with comparative studies of mysticism. These critiques demonstrate that despite its originality and analytical richness, Steinbock’s project requires greater transparency in its methodological foundations and an openness to dialogue with adjacent fields of knowledge.

1. Introduction
The phenomenology of religion has always faced a serious challenge: the tension between its descriptive-transcendental method and the personal, indescribable, and seemingly supra-experiential nature of the sacred. Anthony J. Steinbock's Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (2007) responds boldly to this perennial problem. Introducing "verticality" as a fundamental mode of "givenness" beyond subject-object patterns, Steinbock claims to redefine the horizon of the phenomenology of religion. Through first-person accounts of three mystics from Abrahamic traditions—Teresa of Avila, Dov Baer, and Ruzbihan Baqli—he describes the "manifestation" of the sacred and presents "idolatry" as the inversion of verticality. This work, which won the Edward Goodwin Ballard Prize in 2009, has made significant contributions to the philosophy of religion. However, this article examines two fundamental challenges in the book: first, the methodological tension between the claim to describe lived experience and the practical reliance on interpreting historical texts; second, conceptual ambiguities regarding verticality's relation to the general structure of consciousness and its restriction to Abrahamic traditions, which appears incompatible with comparative studies of mysticism.
2. Materials & Methods
The framework rests on three axes. The first is classical and passive phenomenology (Husserl, Levinas, Marion), assessing Steinbock's methodological fidelity and analyzing the passive, call-like aspect of verticality. Marion's "saturated phenomena"—phenomena that exceed any horizon of expectation and shatter the subject—is the closest theoretical framework, though Marion emphasizes intuitive saturation while Steinbock stresses the vertical and ethical-transformative dimension. The second axis is philosophical hermeneutics in two domains: Ricoeur's "distanciation" and the Heideggerian-Gadamerian historicity of understanding. Here, prejudices are conditions of understanding, not obstacles. Accordingly, the critique rests on the conflict between the desire for essentialist science in phenomenology and the historicity of understanding in philosophical hermeneutics. The third axis is comparative philosophy of religion (Katz, Forman), evaluating the claim of verticality's exclusivity to Abrahamic traditions. The method is analytical-critical and deconstructive, assessing the internal consistency of Steinbock's project and exploring unresolved tensions between description and interpretation, the universal and the particular, and phenomenology and theology.
3. Discussion & Result
The analysis reveals two major challenges. First, the methodological challenge: Steinbock claims to describe mystical lived experience, yet his raw material consists of historical texts embedded in powerful interpretive traditions. This gap between direct lived experience and mediated textual access raises the question of a phenomenology without judgment. From the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, Steinbock stops at the initial stage of "understanding" and ignores the "distanciation" of the text. In philosophical hermeneutics, however, all understanding is already situated within a historical-linguistic horizon, and prejudices are conditions of understanding. Thus, the critique rests on the incompatibility between the supra-historical desire of phenomenology and the fundamental historicity of philosophical hermeneutics. Steinbock interprets texts that are themselves constructs of the interpretation of that experience in a theological context. Consequently, his method resembles textual interpretation more than direct phenomenological description, leaving the project in an unresolved "hermeneutic circle." Second, the conceptual challenge: the claim that "vertical givenness" operates entirely outside the noesis-noema structure faces an internal contradiction. "Complete givenness" is incompatible with the "infinite deepening" of experience. This suggests verticality is not a break from the intentional paradigm but an extreme formulation of "radical passivity" within it. Yet Steinbock does not link it clearly to Husserl's passive synthesis, leaving an ontological ambiguity. Moreover, his conceptual network is saturated with Abrahamic theological terms (grace, call, manifestation), and he reproduces religious pre-understandings as universal phenomenological categories rather than historical-linguistic conditions of understanding—thereby blurring the boundary between phenomenology and philosophical theology. Furthermore, the absence of "faith" and the risk of experiential reductionism push the project toward a quasi-mystical philosophy of religion. Comparatively, limiting the study to Abrahamic traditions leads to methodological exclusivism, despite contemporary studies showing that unitive experiences in non-dual traditions exhibit similar phenomenological structures. Finally, his social critique of modernity falls into the paradox of modernity: he criticizes modernity with modern weapons.
4. Conclusion
Despite its originality and analytical richness, the project requires greater methodological transparency, comparative openness, and a redefinition of its epistemological status. The work's lasting value lies not in definitive answers but in its precise formulation of fundamental questions that will delineate the future boundaries of the field. Future research should: develop a clear combined methodology distinguishing methodological from philosophical hermeneutics; expand comparative dialogue to non-Abrahamic traditions; link this phenomenology with systematic theology to address concepts such as faith, revelation, and religious institution; and transform macro-social critique into multidimensional analyses. Ultimately, Steinbock's importance lies in challenging philosophical complacency and insisting on the most difficult question: how can we speak of a structure of experience that both passively affects the subject and calls him to ethical-social action? Phenomenology and Mysticism, standing on this complex boundary, has made itself an inspiring source and an unavoidable launching pad for any serious research in the future of the philosophy of religion and phenomenology.