Introduction
The book “Philosophy of the Science of Jurisprudence”, written by Hujjat al-Islam, Dr. Saeed Ziyaifar, is one of the first works on the philosophy of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in Iran and remains one of the few available resources on this subject. The book is notable for its well-organized structure, precise categorization of topics, and exploration of various possibilities related to them, alongside extensive research and accurate references to primary sources. Despite these positive attributes, there are some shortcomings in the book that, if addressed in future editions, could enhance its value. One of the most challenging sections is Chapter Four, titled "The Goals of the Science of Jurisprudence". This article provides structural and content-related critiques of this chapter.
Methodology
The data for this study were gathered through library research, utilizing both printed and electronic sources. The analysis was carried out using a descriptive-analytical approach. Initially, some of the topics discussed in Philosophy of the Science of Jurisprudence are summarized, followed by a critical analysis of these issues, primarily from the perspective of the science of Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence).
Discussion and Conclusion
Chapter Four of Philosophy of the Science of Jurisprudence consists of introductory discussions, four sub-sections, and two concluding discussions. In the first sub-section, the author delves into the important issue of "Methods for Discovering the Goals of Shari'a," outlining three main, non-integrative methods for discovering the goals of Shari'a: the textual method, the rational method, and the empirical method. The author then mentions the possibility of combining these methods, and in the "Gathering of Evidence" approach, a combination of the aforementioned methods can be utilized. After explaining these methods, the author proceeds with a detailed discussion on the ways in which the goals of the Shari'a can influence Ijtihᾱd (juridical reasoning) and Tafaqquh (religious knowledge). The chapter concludes with a brief reference to "Examples of the Goals of the Shari'a". Several structural criticisms can be made regarding this chapter, including the unsatisfactory placement and order of some key discussions, such as "Methods for Proving the Dimensions of Fiqh Rulings," "Methods for Discovering the Goals of Shari'a," and "Methods for Influencing Ijtihᾱd and Tafaqquh." Another category of critiques pertains to the content of the chapter. The main content-related criticisms addressed in this article include:
1.          A blending of "Shari'a and Juridical Rulings" with "The Science of Deductive Jurisprudence" on the one hand, and a mixing of "The Goals and Objectives of the Shari'a" with "The Cause and Grounds of Rulings" on the other. This results in some back-and-forth between these concepts.
2.          The author applies the views of the 'Usulī (rationalist) and Akhbᾱrī (traditionalist) scholars on "Ruling and its Cause" to the discussion of "The Goals of the Science of Fiqh," which does not seem to be a solid comparison.
3.          In this chapter, the concept of Qīyᾱs Mansūs al-‘Illah (analogy based on a stated cause) is listed as a way of discovering the rational cause of rulings. However, this analogy is, firstly, dependent on recognizing the cause (not its method), and secondly, the method of discovering the cause in this type of analogy is based on textual sources, not rational reasoning.
4.          The book's discussion on the scope of the applicability of incomplete induction (istiqrᾱ’ nᾱqis) in discovering the goals of Shari'a is ambiguous, and the foundational argument for it is not established. Similar ambiguities are found in other key sections of the chapter, such as the empirical method and the methods for proving the dimensions of juridical rulings.
5.          The definition of analogy (qīyᾱs) and its function, as presented by the respected author, requires serious reconsideration in light of the common terminology used in Fiqh and 'Usūl, and the views of Islamic scholars. In Chapter Four, the unknown object to which analogy is applied to gain knowledge is described as the goal or cause of a ruling. However, according to the traditional definition of analogy, the unknown in an analogy is the ruling of the second subject, not its cause. Proponents of analogy argue that they have identified the cause of the ruling in two subjects—albeit tentatively—and thus derive the ruling of the second subject.
Conclusion
While The Philosophy of the Science of Jurisprudence presents numerous strengths, it also contains points that are open to critique, and it is recommended that these issues be addressed in future revisions. Chapter Four of the book, in particular, is worthy of further consideration and critique in at least two respects: first, the "order of presentation," "selection of main and subsidiary titles," and "the relationship between some of the topics" could be restructured to provide a more logical flow, making the text easier to follow for the reader and improving the proportionality of the various discussions. This would also ensure that significant topics are more effectively represented in the table of contents; second, some content in Chapter Four, both in terms of its internal coherence with other sections of the book and from the perspective of 'Usūl al-Fiqh, requires revision to ensure clarity and consistency